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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a response to Aldo Leopold's 1949 call 
for a new, wholistic environmental ethic. Leopold's call 
stemmed from his concern over the increasing degradation of 
the environment as a result of a utilitarian approach which 
judges nature as good only insofar as it is good for human 
economic and recreational benefit. This thesis is aimed at 
the development of a wholistic, non-utilitarian 
environmental ethic grounded in the philosophy. of Immanuel 
Kant. 
The thesis begins with a brief review of the 
utilitarian environmental ethic which Leopold opposed and 
some of the consequences it has wrought in the natural 
world. It then examines some of the alternative 
environmental ethics which have already been proposed and 
their shortcomings. These new, alternative environmental 
ethics generally fall into one of three categories: neo-
utilitarianism, animal rights, and eco-feminism. 
I next undertake an examination of Immanuel Kant's 
philosophy as it concerns theory of knowledge, moral theory, 
teleological judgments of nature, and aesthetic judgment. 
Kant's theory of knowledge leads us to a view of nature, as 
an organized system, and human beings, as distinct 
individuals, as mutually dependent. Kant's moral theory 
argues that human biological life ought to be subordinated 
to human moral life. Also Kant's moral theory, applied to 
private action, requires a critical thought process. This 
same critical thought process is engendered when his moral 
theory is applied to public action. Kant's theory of 
teleological judgment regarding nature leads us to a view of 
nature as a system of ends directed towards the 
establishment of a "realm of ends," a moral world community. 
Kant's aesthetic theory saves nature, as natural beauty, 
from appropriative human claims. Just as our sensible 
nature ought to be subordinate to our moral nature, so too 
our approach to nature as useful ought to be subordinate to 
our approach to nature as beautiful. 
Kantian philosophy results in a number of duties on the 
part of human beings as moral beings towards nature. We 
have a duty to preserve nature as a changing, balanced 
diversity~ We have a duty to treat the non-human parts of 
nature as components of a systemic whole. How these duties 
ought to be fulfilled will be affected by contextual 
factors, and ought to be decided through public discourse. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
One of the earliest calls for a new environmental ethic 
was that of Aldo Leopold in 1949. 1 This call was issued in 
response to what Leopold viewed as a purely utilitarian 
approach towards the natural world. Leopold held that 
contemporary humans viewed nature as a tool, an instrument, 
to be used merely as a means for economic, recreational and 
aesthetic benefit. 2 Leopold considered such an approach 
short sighted and unacceptable as destructive to the biotic 
community. 3 
Statement of Purpose 
This thesis is a response to Leopold's challenge. Its 
aim is the development of a wholistic, non-utilitarian 
environmental ethic based on the philosophy of Immanuel 
.._,., ...... 
1Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac and Sketches Here 
and There (New York: Oxford Press, 1987), p. 209. 
2Regarding the use of the term 'nature', it is, in 
part, due to a habit of language that we use the term 
'nature' as though it represented something apart from us, 
as though nature were something 'out there'~, As will be 
seen in Chapter 2, however, according to the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant nature is a product of the irrepressible 
organizational activity of human understanding. Thus, it is 
not simply the case that we cannot know nature apart from 
us. Rather, there can be no nature apart from us, and we 
cannot exist apart from nature., 
3Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, pp. 224-225. 
2 
Kant. 4 I will begin with a short description of the 
utilitarian approach criticized by Leopold. 5 I will next 
give a review of the literature regarding the alternative 
expansionist ethics that have, so far, been offered by 
others, and explore their inadequacies and resultant 
problems. By "expansionist ethics" I mean those ethical 
systems which seek to enlarge or expand the set of entities 
deemed as qualifying for moral consideration. In other 
words, expansionist ethics increase the number of types of 
entities in connection with which our conduct is considered 
to have an ethical component. Some expansionist ethics are 
still utilitarian in nature, for example, those of Baird 
Callicott and Arne Naess. Such ethics seek to enlarge the 
circle of moral consideration because such expansion is seen 
as being in the material interest of human beings. Such 
approaches are, then, a more sophisticated version of the 
traditional utilitarian approach; thus, I term them neo-
utilitarian. I will then develop an environmental ethic 
grounded in Kantian philosophy. 
4By "wholistic" I mean an ethic which recognizes that 
identity .and definition are, in part, relational. In other 
words, knowing what a natural entity is involves knowing not 
only its characteristics or predicates but also its 
relationships with other entities. A wholistic ethic, then, 
recognizes at a very fundamental level the 
interconnectedness of all natural entities. 
5It should be noted that the term 'utilitarian' does not 
refer to the philosophical theory. Rather, it signifies the 
concept of that which can be put to use. 
3 
A key to the problems of both utilitarian and 
expansionist approaches to environmental ethics is the 
decision-making calculus specific to each: in a utilitarian 
approach the calculus is inappropriately anthropocentric; in 
an expansionist approach the'ethic blurs the lines of 
distinction between humans and animals which, in turn, leads 
to a problematic decision-making calculus. 
As previously mentioned, Leopold called for a new 
environmental ethic in response to a utilitarian ethic which 
had been and continues to be the prevailing environmental 
ethic of the modern period. Predator destruction and the 
compromise of wilderness areas are but two examples of this 
utilitarian approach. Leopold cited the frequent practice, 
with regard to wilderness areas, of the initial, systematic 
elimination of native predators because they were viewed as 
threats to the native game species and, thus, threats to the 
pleasures of human hunters. This, in turn, led to an 
overpopulation of game species and increased hunting for 
sport. Sport hunting required the building of roads and 
other developed facilities. 6 In some cases this was 
foilowed by the introduction of exotic game species as well. 
We are left with a wilderness area of reduced wildness. We 
are left with hardly wilderness at all. It is, rather, 
managed nature, a natural area altered to better satisfy the 
6Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac, p. 191. 
4 
needs and desires of human beings. Although not as fully 
domesticated as the areas of regular human habitation, it is 
nevertheless a nature considerably tamed and tailored to 
human tastes. 
The history of species-reintroduction programs is also 
indicative of a utilitarian approach to nature. Species-
reintroduction programs have existed within the United 
States since the early part of this century. One of the 
first was that headed by Dr. R. N. Looney which brought 
eighty-five elk from Yellowstone National Park to the 
Mogollon Rim of northern Arizona in 1913. Arizona's 
indigenous elk population had been completely depleted more 
than twenty-five years earlier. With serious overpopulation 
of the Yellowstone herds, due in part to the government's 
elimination of natural predators, the United States 
government offered eighty-five elk to any state in which the 
animal had become extinct, with the proviso that all costs 
be paid by the importing state. Dr. Looney, a dentist by 
profession, organized such an effort. As a result, northern 
Arizona now enjoys an elk population of approximately 
twenty-thousand. 7 
Species-reintroduction programs have continued ever 
since with varying degrees of success. Species as different 
7David E. Brown, "Return of the Natives," Wilderness 52 
(Winter 1988): p. 40. 
as bighorn sheep and thick-billed parrots have been the 
subjects of such efforts. 8 Nearly all reintroduction 
programs, however, have shared one common characteristic 
regardless of site location or predicted success rates. 
5 
With extremely rare exceptions, such reintroduction programs 
have dealt with species which are not primary predators. By 
"primary predators" I mean those indigenous species other 
than human beings which occupy the ultimate niches in the 
food chain in a given area. Three species, consistently 
rejected as subjects for such reintroduction programs, are 
Panthera onca, the jaguar; Canis lupus, the grey wolf or 
timber wolf; and Ursus horribilis, the grizzly bear. 9 
In 1967 the grey wolf was officially declared an 
endangered species, and, as such, came under the protection 
of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. It was not until 
1987, however, twenty years later, that the Northern Rocky 
Mountain Wolf Recovery Plan (NRMWRP} was finally approved at 
the national level. Nevertheless, since implementation of 
the plan was left up td the pertinent states, no wolves have 
yet been reintroduced due to the opposition of local 
stockmen. 10 The sole attempt to date regarding grey wolf 
reintroduction, and even this was not part of the NRMWRP, 
8Ibid., p. 45. 
9Ibid. , p. 4 6. 
10 b'd I 1 ., pp. 48-49. 
was the release of four wolves in northern Michigan. In 
less than one year, two wolves were shot, one was trapped 
and killed, and one was struck and killed by a car. 11 It 
remains fairly clear, then, that the large, primary 
predators continue to be viewed as undesirable. They are 
undesirable in that they threaten, either directly or 
indirectly, that which we consider economically valuable, 
recreationally valuable, and that from which we derive 
aesthetic pleasure. 
The same is true of our approach to wilderness areas. 
6 
The Wilderness Act of 1964 defined wilderness, in part, as 
"· .. an area where the earth and its community of life are 
untrammeled by man, where man. is a visitor who does 
not remain. 1112 Yet Section 4 of the Act allows continued 
mining for an indefinite period of time by any company which 
staked a claim before 1984. The Act also allows the 
development of water resources at the discretion of the 
President; the grazing of livestock; and the use of 
airplanes and motorboats if such practices were allowed 
prior to the Act. 13 Currently, the Congress is considering 
11Ibid. , p. 4 8. 
12Edward B. Weinstock, The Wilderness War (New York: 
Julian Messner, 1982), p. 110. 
13 , • Ibid., p. 111. 
opening up the Arctic Wildlife Refuge to commercial oil 
exploration and drilling. 
7 
The foregoing can all serve as examples of the 
utilitarian approach to the environment which has pervaded 
secular Western culture throughout the modern period. The 
effects of this utilitarian approach to the environment have 
become increasingly deleterious and obvious over the last 
thirty years. Species extiriction, in itself a naturally 
occurring phenomenon, now occurs at a rate of 17,500 species 
per year. 14 In some cases species' extinction and near-
extinction has been deliberate. Most frequently, however, 
it has been a secondary result of human activity through 
destruction of habitat, the introduction of exotic species 
(usually game species), and the proliferation of harmful 
chemicals. 
Another equally serious effect is the increasing 
competition among nations, as well as smaller entities, for 
decreasing resources. The United states, which comprises 
4.8% of the world's population, uses 23% of the planet's 
energy resources. 15 The American dependence on oil, a 
14The California Nature Conservancy as reported in 
11 Eco news, 11 =G-=r..;:e=e=n~p;:..;e=a=c=e'---=-M=a::..;;g""'a:::.;z=-=i.:.:n=e, October/November/ December 
1991, p. 7. 
15The population percentage is based on figures for 
1987 compiled in The World Almanac and Book of Facts, 1988, 
ed. Marks. Hoffman. (New.York: Pharos Books, 1988), p. 522 
and p. 532. The energy percentage is based on figures for 
1987 compiled by the United Nations, Department of 
dependence which exceeds its own oil resources, was a 
contributing factor in the recent Persian Gulf War. 
Interstate disputes have also occurred recently over the 
division of shared resources, for example, the 1990 dispute 
over regulation of flow rates on the Missouri River. 
8 
Finally, we are experiencing increasing degradation of 
the biosphere overall. This is evidenced by such phenomena 
as the polar holes developing in the ozone layer, 
increasingly frequent health alerts in some major cities due 
to poor air quality, and, according to some climatologists, 
the increase of global warming. On a smaller scale, 
environmental degradation has caused more and more cities 
and citizens to be concerned about water quality and water-
source depletion. 
Alternative Expansionist Ethics 
Such ecological degradation has led some philosophers 
to develop new, alternative environmental ethics. Although 
differing from each other in some aspects, these alternative 
ethics fall into three major groups: nee-utilitarianism, 
animal rights, and eco-feminism. All are basically 
expansionist approaches. That is to say, all seek to expand 
the cifcl~ of ethical concern beyond the limits 6f the 
traditional utilitarian approach. 
International and Social Affairs, Statistical Office, 1987 
Energy Statistics Yearbook (New York: United Nations, 1989), 
p. 90 and p. 96. 
9 
A number of philosophers have argued for a wholistic or 
nee-utilitarian approach on varying grounds. Callicott 
argues in favor of a safe minimum standard of conservation. 
Such an approach calls for the setting of guidelines 
regarding an acceptable minimum amount of land and species 
to be set aside and preserved. In other words, a certain 
percentage of land is to be left in its natural condition to 
ensure the continuation of the evolutionary process and the 
various life-supporting cycles. 16 His argument, however, is 
admittedly founded on "economic value. 1117 Naess decries the 
atomistic view of traditional utilitarianism and calls for 
"Gestalt thinking." 18 He argues that, as our understanding 
of biotic systems increases, we must cease to view the 
physical world in terms of individual objects or species. 
Rather, we should approach the environment in terms of 
systems or biomes. 
Central to all these arguments is the necessity for a 
healthy earth as a home for humans. Such arguments arise 
out of an increasing knowledge of the science of ecology. 
In other words, as our understanding of the 
16J. Baird Callicott, "On the Intrinsic Value of 
Nonhuman Species," The Preservation of Species, ed. Bryan G. 
Norton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 
131. 
17Ibid., p. 132. 
18Arne Naess, "The Primacy of the Whole," Holism and 
Ecology (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1981), p. 2. 
10 
interconnectedness. of the physical world grows, we have more 
' ', - \ ' - ' ', 
and gre_ater reasons for s~,eking a wholistic approach. Yet 
such an approach is still utilitarian in its concept of 
nature. It still,results in a decision-making calculus 
which is clearly anthropocentric in its weighting. It is an 
enlightened and enlarged utilitarianism, but a 
utilitarianism nonetheless. 
In his book, Animal Liberation, Peter Singer argues 
that the capacity f.or feeling pain or pleasure "is the only 
defensible boundary of concern for the interests of 
others. 1119 He goes on to argue that the principle of 
equality requires equal consideration of interests. It is 
at best interesting to consider the possession of rights as 
grounded in the. capacity for pleasure and pain. Such an 
approach derives from a definition of happiness, as the 
purpose of life, in terms of the enjoyment of pleasure and 
the avoidance of pain. Such an approach is grounded in 
wants rather than needs. 
But to speak of wants as something separate and apart 
from needs with regard to animals seems questionable at 
best. On the contrary, it seems clear that animal wants, if 
they exist, are inextricably linked to needs in a way that 
is significantly different from human wants and needs. It 
19Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: The New York 
Review, 1975), p. 9. 
11 
may be the case that a lioness wants a wildebeest for her 
meal, but it clearly cannot be the case that any lion wants 
to be a vegetarian. 
Further, Singer's requirement of equal consideration, 
when taken to its ultimate, logical end, results in a 
decision-making calculus that is, in marginal cases, 
unproductive or, at least, unclear. According to Singer's 
line of reasoning, the interests of a comatose human being 
deserve less consideration that the interests of a starling. 
The interests of a severely retarded child may or may not 
deserve consideration equal to the consideration owed to the 
interests of a normal chimpanzee depending on the extent to 
which that child is thought to experience pleasure or pain 
according to some third party. 
Tom Regan bases his argument for animal rights on the 
intrinsic value of a nonhuman animal as the subject-of-a-
life. In his book, The Case for Animal Rights, he states 
"(a) variety of reasons makes it reasonable to view 
mammalian animals as individuals who, like us, have beliefs 
and desires.''w To speak of 'beliefs', 'desires' and 
'individuals', I contend, is questionable with regard to 
animals. Animals certainly evidence instinctive and 
habitual behaviors. But habit and instinct are not 
2
~om Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1983), p. 78. 
12 
equivalent to 'belief'. On the'contrary, habitual behavior 
in humans generally arises as a consequence of belief. 
Desires are linked to wants which, as previously 
mentioned, seem directly linked to needs with regard to 
animals. Even if we grant that desires are possessed by 
animals, such desires cannot be known to us. We may, upon 
extended study and observation, be able to recognize what 
animals need but not what they want. This is due to the 
simple fact that we cannot experience life, the environment, 
or existence as anything other than a human being. The most 
fertile human imagination will never know what it is to be 
something or someone other than a human being. 
To speak of animals as individuals is also incorrect. 
A given animal may be considered as an individual member of 
its species; i.e.; as a single example of the species, but 
that is not at all the same as being an individual. 
Existence-as-an-individual is a characteristic which, since 
the ancient Greeks, has been reserved for human beings. It 
was on this ground that the Greeks distinguished between 
bios and zoe. Animal life, zoe, was considered species 
life. A species was immortal due to its continuation 
through procreation. Human life, bios, was viewed as the 
only form of mortal life since human life was viewed as 
individual life. Mere continuation of the human species 
through procreation could not provide immortality to the 
individual human being. 21 
13 
In criticizing both Singer and Regan, Roger King states 
"[t]he extension of the moral domain to include some animals 
is possible because some people are willing to allow that 
suffering in animals, for example, is as morally wrong as 
suffering in human beings. 1122 I question, however, whether 
this really says something about animals. The fact that the 
inflicting of suffering for no good end is widely considered 
unethical really says something about human beings. 
Animals, after ~11, do not concern themselves with the moral 
rightness or wrongness of our suffering or even the 
suffering of other animals. It is not unusual for a cat or 
dog to play a small animal to death and then to walk away 
without eating the animal so killed. 
It is true that particular animals do, on occasion, 
respond to emotional states experienced by nearby humans. 
For example, if my dog sees me weeping, he will very likely 
approach me quietly, sit down next to me and put his head 
gently in my lap in a manner that appears sympathetic. Very 
2
~annah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 18-19. 
22R.oger J. H. King, "Caring About Nature: Feminist Ethics 
and the Environment," Hypatia 6, special issue (Spring 1991): 
p. 78. 
14 
young children frequently respond to the emotional states of 
their adult caretakers even when they, the children, are not 
yet capable of genuinely comprehending the full character of 
the emotion being experienced by the adult. 23 Similarly, 
if I walk into a room of adults and immediately perceive 
that everyone present has a look of terrified panic, I will 
likely begin to feel at least anxious myself. But unlike my 
sympathetic dog or the empathizing child, I will not just 
react to the terror and panic of the surrounding adults. I 
will begin to seek out the cause of their fear. 
To the best of our knowledge, we alone possess the 
capacity to reflect upon ourselves and our actions from a 
distanced and impersonal perspective, to step out of 
ourselves figuratively and consider questions concerning the 
mode of our existence and its meaning. We live in a world; 
animals live within their surroundings. The world in which 
we live is, itself, a conceptual organization of that which 
surrounds us. We are able to take a distanced perspective 
because we are able to engage in symbolic; i.e., conceptual, 
thought. We alone, then, are capable of being moral agents. 
The discipline of ethics and the possibility of a self-
legislated morality exist uniquely as powers of human self-
reflective .consciousness. One does not blame the coyote for 
23Faul Thomas Young, Emotion in Man and Animal: Its 
Nature and Dynamic Basis, 2nd. ed. (Huntington: Robert E. 
Krieger Publishing Co., 1973), pp. 352-353. 
15 
eating the prairie dog. Nor does the coyote consider 
whether such behavior is ethical or not. Human beings are a 
part of nature (having evolved within nature), but human 
beings as moral agents are, in a very special way, also 
different from all other forms in nature. 24 To ignore this 
distinction between human beings and animals is to ignore 
the very capacity which allows these authors to formulate 
their arguments. 
Another major objection, on my part, to the animal 
rights approach is that it operates on an individualized 
basis. Its concern is with individual members rather than 
species as species. Tom Regan specifically states 
The rights view is not opposed to efforts to save 
endangered species. It only insists that we be 
clear about the reasons for doing so. On the 
rights view, the reason we ought to save the 
members of endangered species of animals is not 
because the s~ecies is endangered but because the 
individual animals have valid claims. 25 
This view, however, imparts to animals an existence-
as-individuals which is specious. As mentioned earlier, 
since the time of the ancient Greeks, animal life has been 
24ay "nature" I mean, not only the physical objects and 
entities of the world, but also the cycles and processes 
which make life possible, and the relationships between and 
among th~ objects, entities, cycles and processes. Nature, 
therefore, is not a static state, thing or place, but 
dynamic. It is, itself, an evolutionary process 
characterized by both equilibrium and imbalance, constancy 
and change, regularity and randomness. 
25Tom Regan, Animal Rights, p. 360. 
16 
viewed as species-existence. This is not mere prejudice on 
the part of humans. It is true that members of some animal 
species recognize other members of their species as specific 
individuals. For example, horses form social attachments 
with other horses, usually on a pair basis, which are 
stable, specific, and individual. In other words, the 
social attachment between horse A and horse B within a herd 
(or a stable) involves the recognition and identification on 
the part of horse A of the identity of horse B, not merely 
as another member of horse A's species, but as a particular 
member. 26 I contend, however, that the recognition of a 
specific, individual animal does not serve as proof that the 
recognizing or recognized animal possesses a self similar to 
what we mean when we use the term 'self' with reference to 
humans. Some animals may have a sense of themselves, but 
not a concept of self. Animal life, that is, may be 
characterized by multiplicity but not plurality. 
Human life is characterized by plurality. Human 
plurality, what Hannah Arendt described as "the paradoxical 
plurality of unique beings," involves the qualities of 
distinctness and sameness.u If human beings did not 
possess sufficient sameness, communication between 
2
~eorge H. Waring, Horse Behavior (Park Ridge: Noyes 
Publications, 1983), p. 148. 
27Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 176. 
17 
individuals· regarding ourselves and our world would not be 
possible. Indeed, 'our world' itself is only possible 
because we possess a sameness sufficient to make a view-in-
common possible. If we possessed only distinctness, without 
sameness, we would be condemned to lives of isolation. At 
the same time, without distinctness, our lives would devolve 
to identicality. It is the fact of our distinctness, each 
from every other, that makes speech necessary. As Arendt 
points out, if we were not individually different, "(s]igns 
and sounds to communicate immediate, identical needs and 
wants would be enough."~ It is, then, the condition of 
human plurality which makes speech both possible and also 
necessary. 29 
· Human plurality is also the basic condition of action 
in the sense of th~ classical Greek praxis. Action, unlike 
labor, is not motivated by physical necessity. Neither is 
action, like work, aimed at the production of artifacts. 
Rather, it is "the only activity that goes on directly 
28rbid. 
29By 'speech' I mean a system of symbolic communication 
which includes concepts and is rich enough to make our 
experiences of the external world, and our experiences of 
our inner states, communicable to others and ourselves. 
Speech is inherently public. It is public in that it 
presupposes the presence of another, speech is one means of 
communication between people. Even internal speech, the 
inner dialogue between me and myself, engages me as if I 
were two--I the speaker, and I the listener. Speech is one 
activity by means of which we shape our world, and it, in 
turn, shapes us. 
18 
between men without the intermediary of things or matter. 1130 
But action in the sense of praxis is only possible if there 
is first arche. Arche is the capacity to make a beginning, 
to initiate, to start something into motion. 31 It is this 
capacity of inexhaustible spontaneity to bring into being 
something new which is the mark of human life. Indeed, each 
of us at birth is a new beginning, the start of something 
(really someone) that has never existed before or since. So 
it is that we can meaningfully ask only of another human 
being "Who (not what) are you?" It is important to remember 
that we are addressed and treated as individual selves even 
before we are, ourselves, aware of ourselves. Once we are 
self-aware, we continue to be confirmed as selves by the 
speech and actions of others at the same time that we reveal 
ourselves through speech and action to others. Although 
both speech and action are, thus, revelatory, it is speech 
that is primary of the two. As Arendt points out, an action 
can be perceived in its "brute physical appearance" without 
accompanying speech, but the action cannot be fully 
understood unless the actor, by means of speech, can 
communicate the accompanying intention. 32 So it is that 
Arendt goes onto state 
3
°ttannah Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 7. 
31Ibid., p. 177. 
32Ibid. , p. 179 . 
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, 
reveal actively their unique personal identities 
and thus make their appearance in the human world. 
. . .. This disclosure of "who" in 
contradistinction to "what" somebody is ... is 
implicit in everything somebody says and does. 33 
Human beings thus encounter each other as unique 
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individuals due to and through speech and action. If animal 
life were characterized by plurality, each and every animal 
would be capable of encountering each and all other animals 
as humans are capable of encountering each other, as unique 
individuals. With rare and limited exceptions, this they do 
not do. 
My final criticism of expansionist approaches is that, 
while enlarging the circle of ethical consideration, they 
nevertheless leave some natural entities outside the circle. 
Tom Regan's argument is specifically limited to "mammalian 
animals." singer's argument, being based on the capacity to 
feel pleasure or pain, likewise leaves nonsentient entities 
(trees, mountains, rivers, etc.) outside the boundary of 
ethical concern. Therefore, such approaches can hardly lead 
to the wholistic ethic called for by Leopold. 
One of the newest alternative environmental ethics 
being put forward is that of eco-feminism. Karen Warren, a 
major voice in this movement, and Jim Cheney define eco-
feminism in part as involving 
33Ibid. 
a shift from a conception of ethics as primarily a 
matter of right, rules or principles predetermined 
and applied in specific cases to entities viewed 
as competitors in the context of moral standing 
[to an ethic that] makes a central place for 
values of love, care, friendship, trust and 
appropriate reciprocity-values. that presuppose 
that our relationships to others are central to our 
understanding of who we are. 34 
Deborah Slicer, another eco-feminist writer, criticizes 
traditional ethical theories based on principles as not 
allowing for feeling, context, relationship, virtue, and 
affection. 35 
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Warren and Cheney liken eco-feminism to a patchwork 
quilt in which each piece represents a response to a given 
environmental problem. In such a quilt, although no two 
pieces are the same, the aggregate comprises a whole and a 
successful design is created. Analogously, although eco-
feminism allows for many and varied approaches, actions and 
solutions to various environmental questions, it remains a 
genuine ethic. . . t For example, an eco-feminist response to the 
question of hunting by Aleuts may well be different from an 
eco-feminist response to the question of deer hunting by 
Iowans due to the differences in culture and context. 
Anticipating charges of ethical relativism, Warren and 
3
~aren · J. Warren and Jim Cheney, "Ecological Feminism 
and Ecosystem Ecology," Hypatia 6, special issue (Spring 
1991): p. 187. 
35Deborah Slicer, "Your Daughter or Your Dog? A 
Feminist Assessment of the Animal Research Issue," Hypatia 
6, special issue (Spring 1991): p. 113. 
Cheney go on to argue that, just' as a crazy quilt has a 
defining border, so too eco-feminism has a defining 
guideline. This guideline includes the inadmissability of 
hierarchical thinking, and all attitudes of domination. 36 
In other words, although eco-feminism cannot clearly 
enumerate what is required for inclusion in the ethic, it 
can state what cannot be included. It does, then, set a 
guideline in the negative sense according to Warren and 
Cheney. 
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One question arises, however, with regard to eco-
feminism's stalwart opposition to hierarchical thinking. Is 
hierarchical thinking itself the source of problems or, 
rather, the criteria upon which it is based? Is not 
hierarchical thinking, at least in some contexts, necessary? 
Any decisiori involving a choice of possibilities requires 
the weighing of those possibilities. The very activity of 
weighing possibilities, of choosing between possibilities, 
requires that the possibilities be ranked in preference. 
This is hierarchical thinking. 
Whether or not eco-feminism's defining guideline is 
sufficient to save the ethic from relativism, two serious 
problems remain: Which values are to be central to the 
ethic? Which and/or whose feelings are to be given 
36Karen Warren and Jim Cheney, "Ecological Feminism," pp. 
180-181. 
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consideration and to what degree? Although future 
discussion may well clarify and enumerate the values to be 
given primacy, it is unlikely, if not impossible, that 
further debate and discussion will firmly decide which or 
whose feelings. Feelings are inherently subjective. I am 
reminded of a cartoon which appeared in The New Yorker. A 
couple is shown standing at a scenic overlook. He is a 
prosperous businessman (portly, three-piece suit and tie). 
As he gazes out over a beautiful, undeveloped valley he 
exclaims, "What a great place to build something!" Although 
we may chuckle at such humor, the fact remains that some 
people honestly respond in just that way to such vistas. 
How am I, or anyone, to tell such a person that· she or he is 
wrong? How are we to argue feelings? Such a contextually 
and relationally·oriented ethic cannot but give rise to a 
number of serious questions. At what point does the fact of 
relationship pass into self-interest? At what point do 
context and affection pass into exception? If, out of a 
love for animals, I argue that pets should be neutered, as 
many do argue, does the fact that the pet in question is my 
pet, my exceptionally intelligent (in my eyes) pet, really 
allow me to make an exception in its case? 
It is my contention that two concepts are required in 
any new environmental ethic: a recognition that only human 
beings exist as individuals; and a (related) recognition 
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that humans are distinctly unique as the only beings capable 
of moral action. I further contend that an environmental 
ethic which includes these concepts, avoids a utilitarian 
anthropocentrism, and is wholistic in its approach can be 
constructed out of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. 
My choice of Kant as a source for a new environmental 
ethic is based on a number of key points within his 
philosophy. An environmental ethic influenced by Kant 
escapes the anthropocentrism of utilitarianism because it 
recognizes an interdependent relationship between humans and 
nature. Kant's treatment of natural beauty as outlined in 
the third Critique preserves nature from appropriative 
claims by humans even as the experience of natural beauty 
contributes to our growth as moral agents. Further, a 
Kantian based ethic avoids the pitfalls of expansionist 
ethics because Kant provides a sound and clear distinction 
between humans and other natural entities based on moral 
agency. Finally, Kant's treatment, in the third Critique, 
of natural entities as organisms rather than mechanisms 
will, I contend, lead to an environmental ethic which is 
wholistic rathe~ than atomistic. This is the task I shall 
now take up. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A KANTIAN APPROACH 
This chapter will examine Kant's theory of knowledge, 
his moral theory and its political application, and his 
theory of judgment. Each theory will be reviewed with 
particular emphasis on those points which are most 
significant with reference to an environmental ethic. It 
will be shown that Kant's theory of knowledge leads to a 
view of human beings and nature as mutually dependent. 
Kant's moral theory, it will be shown, calls for: ethical 
thought and action; public discourse in determining ethical 
public action; and nature as the arena in which we act. 
Kant's theory of teleological judgment will be shown to 
result in a view of nature as a system of ends in which (but 
not over which} human beings have a superior position. 
Finally, it will be shown that Kant's theory of aesthetic 
judgment results in an approach to nature incompatible with 
and superior to that of the utilitarian approach. 
Kant's Theory of Knowledge 
Kant's theory of knowledge was a "Copernican 
Revolution." Just as Copernicus dared "to seek the observed 
movements, not in the heavenly bodies, but in the 
spectator," Kant dared to explain our knowledge of the world 
(what we know}, not in terms of the things in the world, but 
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in terms of our perception of such things. 1 In other words, 
the knowledge we have of things in the world is a knowledge 
of things as they appear to and are organized by us, as they 
are for us, not as they are in themselves. Kant refers to 
this distinction between things-as-they-appear-to-us and 
things-as-they-are-in-themselves as the distinction between 
phenomena and noumena. 2 
According to Kant, time and space are a priori 
principles for perception. All external sensations are 
perceived spatially; i.e., as in space. As Kant points out, 
regarding objects outside ourselves, we can imagine some 
o~ject in space, "we can imagine the same space without the 
object, but we cannot imagine the object without the space. 3 
All sensations, both external and internal, are perceived in 
terms of time. A s.ensation is either prior to, after or 
contemporaneous with other sensations. 4 So it is that Kant 
argues that time and space are conditions of sensation. 
Because time and space are a priori, untversal conditions 
for all human sensation, Kant terms them transcendental. 
1Immanuel Kant, critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman 
Kemp Smith (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1965), Bxxii; p. 
25. In this and subsequent citations from this work, 'A' 
refers to the page number of the first edition and 'B' 
refers to the page number of the second edition followed by 
the page number of Prof. Smith's translation. 
2Ibid., A249-250; pp. 265-267. 
3Ibid., A24 = B38-39; p. 68. 
4Ibid., A32-34 = B49-50; pp. 76-77. 
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According to the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, 
our knowledge of things in the world begins with sensation. 
Sensation is the mode of all human perception. Sensations, 
as felt, are aggregates of particular sensations without any 
organization or relation. Perceptions are the result of the 
mental ordering of sensation in terms of space and/or time 
by productive imagination; that which was given in sensation 
as an aggregate, as a perception is ordered by the a priori 
principles of space and/or time. 
Sensations (Empfindung) organized in space and/or time 
are perceptions (Wahrnehmung); perceptions further organized 
by the power of judgment in accordance with the categories 
of the understanding are intuitions (Anschauung). Just as a 
perception is the spatial and/or temporal unity of the 
manifold given in a sensation, an intuition is the 
categorial unity of the manifold present in a perception. 
The categories of the understanding are a priori concepts of 
the understanding. As in the case of time and space, the 
categories of the understanding are organizational concepts 
which we bring to judgments of experience. The categories 
of the understanding, as pure concepts, give the unity 
necessary to synthesize perceptions into intuitions and 
intuitions into concepts. They dictate the types of 
judgment by which concepts are formed. As a priori 
principles of the understanding they, too, are 
transcendental. They are the forms of organization which we 
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necessarily bring to experience. They are the 'hard wiring' 
of human thought. So it is that Kant states, "(o]bjects are 
given to us by means of sensibility, and it alone yields us 
intuitions; they are thought through the understanding, and 
from the understanding arise concepts. 115 Concepts which 
arise out of intuitions by means of thought are empirical 
concepts of the understanding in contrast to the categories 
of the understanding which are a priori concepts of the 
understanding. 
At the most fundamental level, we encounter the world 
sensibly. Objects act upon our senses. That which is 
encountered sensibly is perceived spatially and/or 
temporally. Perceptions are then further organized by 
judgment as intuitions, and from intuitions we construct 
empirical concepts. Intuitions and the empirical concepts 
. . ' 
which arise out of them constitute experience. In this way, 
all human experience begins at the level of sensation. As 
Kant states 
We cannot think an object save through the categories; 
we cannot know an object so thought save through 
intuitions corresponding to these concepts. Now all 
our intuitions are sensible; and this knowledge, in so 
far as its object is given, is empirical. But 
empirical knowledge is experience. 
The categories of the understanding, as a priori 
concepts of the understanding, are independent of 
5Ibid., A19 = B33; p. 65. 
6Ibid., B165; p. 173. 
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sensations. Taken on their own they can provide no 
knowledge of the world. How is it, then, that we are able 
to apply the categories to sensations? How can that which 
is entirely independent of sensations be referred to 
sensations? Kant argues that such referral is possible due 
to the transcendental schemata of the understanding. 7 
As already pointed out, all sensations have, as a 
universal and necessary condition for experience, a temporal 
character. Kant also argues that each of the categories of 
the understanding has a temporal character that is a priori. 
For example, the category of 'cause' has as its 
transcendental schema succession in time. The category of 
'.actuality' has as its transcendental schema existence in a 
specific time. The transcendental schemata are, in other 
words, a priori rules of synthesis with respect to time for 
the categories of the understanding. 8 The transcendental 
schemata, then, mediate between the categories of the 
understanding and sensible phenomena. 
Further, the transcendental schemata are the products 
of imagination. The power of imagination manifests itself 
in two types of activity. Reproductive imagination is what 
we call memory. Productive imagination is creative power. 
It is productive imagination which makes possible the 
organization of sensations into perceptions; the 
7Ibid., A138 = B177; p. 181. 
8Ibid., A144-145 = B183-184; p. 185. 
interpretation of perceptions, according to the categories 
of the understanding, as intuitions; and the synthesis of 
intuitions, by means of judgment, into concepts. How the 
imagination performs these varied tasks we cannot say. 
Imagination, itself, is a faculty such that its working 
cannot be analyzed. We know it only by its effects. 
Imagination, in terms of how it works, is an "activity 
[which] nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to 
discover, and to have open to our gaze. 119 
29 
An intuition is an immediate perception of an obj~ct 
and is singular. A concept of the understanding relates 
only mediately to an object according to some feature which 
the object possesses and which it may have in common with 
. . 
other obj_ects. Such concepts of the understanding, 
empirical concepts, also have (non-transcendental) schemata. 
With regard to an empirical concept, the schema "is a rule 
of synthesis of the imagination. 1110 Given a number of 
particular intuitions which, although differing from each 
other, yet also possess a degree of commonality, I may 
subsume the particular intuitions under an empirical 
concept. The subsumption of the particulars under the 
concept is possible by means of judgment and the imagination 
in accordance with the empirical schema of the concept. For 
example, given the particular intuitions called Lassie, Rin 
9Ibid. 
1
~bid., A141 = B180; p. 182. 
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Tin Tin and Hooch, I am able to subsume them under the 
empirical concept 'dog' according to the schema of the 
concept; i.e., according to the rule of synthesis determined 
by the concept 'dog' for the imagination. Indeed, the very 
process of creating and defining general terms, such as 
'dog', is the production of (non-transcendental) schemata. 
It is also possible for a concept to be related to other 
concepts; i.e., to be a concept of concepts. Again, this is 
possible due to the (non-transcendental) schema which we 
generate in the process of defining a concept-of-concepts. 
Indeed, it is only by means of (non-transcendental) schemata 
that empirical, general concepts can have meaning since, as 
general concepts, they can never be adequately instantiated 
by any, single intuition. 
All knowledge results from acts of judgment. 
Perception is a passive faculty. Passive perception is the 
means by which we are given the substance of potential 
knowledge. The understanding, on the other hand, is active. 
It is the faculty by which we give structure to the 
substance perceived through the senses. The understanding 
thus provides the form of potential knowledge. The faculty 
of judgment, assisted by the imagination, synthesizes 
passive perception and active understanding to produce 
knowledge. Such synthesizing acts of judgment, however, are 
still conditioned by the categories of the understanding. 
All knowledge, then, is unavoidably conditioned by the 
spatio-temporal character of perception and the categories 
of the understanding. 
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Because all knowledge is conditioned by a priori 
principles for perception and conception, nature (as the sum 
of all appearances) is likewise conditioned by these same a 
priori principles. In other words, nature, as experienced 
and thus known by us, must necessarily be a nature known in· 
terms of space, time and the categories of the 
understanding. Regarding an environmental ethic, Kant's 
theory of knowledge so far results in a knowledge of things 
in the world that is, unavoidably, distinctly human in terms 
o~ its conception. We can only have knowledge of things 
insofar as their appearance is structured in accordance with 
a priori concepts; i.e., the categories of the 
understanding, not as they are in themselves. Consequently, 
our knowledge of nature is, likewise, necessarily structured 
in accordance with the same, distinctly human, a priori 
concepts. 
Because the goal of the understanding is the production 
of a systematic unity out of the manifold of experience, the 
categories of the understanding are, themselves, of such a 
character as to make system-building an irrepressible 
activity of the understanding. For example, the a priori 
concept of 'cause', as a category of the understanding, 
makes necessary a view of every event as the effect of a 
cause. So it is that we unavoidably approach nature as an 
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organized system. In experiencing nature we necessarily 
construct a system of nature. 11 Nature is, thus, not merely 
a sum of appearances, but a system. 'Nature' stands for the 
unavoidably systematized sum of knowledge of naturally 
occurring appearances. In other words, nature is a human 
construct; it cannot exist separate from us. Rather, nature 
exists due to the activity of our understanding. 
A view of knowledge as conditioned is, however, 
problematic. Experience is able to provide knowledge of a 
world (as a system of all appearances), but it is not able 
to provide a world-whole. Similarly, although in experience 
we necessarily refer every event to a cause, we are not 
able, experientially, to arrive at a first cause. Every 
event is, necessarily, viewed as having a cause. Every 
cause is, as an'event, necessarily viewed as the result of a 
preceding cause, ad infinitum. According to Kant, in order 
for our knowledge to have true systematic unity, it must 
stand in relation to an overarching framework which is 
unconditioned and necessary. This framework is provided by 
the Transcendental Ideas. 12 
The Transcendental Ideas arise from the expansion of 
the categories of the understanding beyond experience. Kant 
asserts that the Transcendental Ideas, being beyond 
experience, cannot be considered knowledge. They are, 
11Ibid., B163-65, pp. 172-173. 
1
~bid., A311 = B367-368, pp. 308-309. 
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nevertheless, necessary for knowledge. The Transcendental 
Ideas provide the necessary, albeit unattainable, goal of 
thoroughgoing systematic unity towards which knowledge 
strives. "Just as the understanding unifies the manifold in 
the object by means of concepts, so reason unifies the 
manifold of concepts by means of ideas, positing a certain 
collective unity as the goal of the activities of the 
understanding. 1113 As will be seen, the Transcendental Ideas 
of freedom; in the sense of spontaneity; the thinking-I; a 
supersensible, rational source of the world; and a world-
whole are all of interest with regard to an environmental 
ethic. 
The project of constructing this unity of knowledge is 
carried out be means of the powers of judgment and 
imagination. Judgments, 'inasmuch as they are made by each 
of us, are obviously subjective. Knowledge, as objectively 
valid, is dependent upon verification within a community of 
other thinkers. My (subjective) judgment has objective 
validity only if all others, given the same experience, are 
bound to make the same judgment. So it is that Kant states 
that "objective validity and necessary universality (for 
everybody) are equivalent terms. 1114 
1
~bid., A644 = B672, p. 533. 
14Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 
trans. and with an Introduction by Lewis White Beck (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1950), p. 46; (4:29_9). 
The -numbers in parentheses here, and in all subsequent 
citations of Kant other than those from Critique of Pure 
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It must be remembered that this world which we 
construct is not constructed by each of us in isolation. 
Just as we do not come to know ourselves as selves in 
isolation, neither can we come to know the world in 
isolation. Knowing the world and constructing the world are 
both dependent upon the intersubjective character of 
objectively valid knowledge as mentioned earlier. In other 
words, as I develop as a self-conscious being only in and 
through the company of other self-conscious beings, the 
concepts I construct out of experience are constantly 
reviewed by those same others and either confirmed or 
rejected. Further, although each of us constructs the 
~orld, in the Kantian sense, as we come to know it through 
experience, we are all born into a world already constructed 
by those. who have preceded us. Although this construction 
can, and does~. change over time, we do not each construct 
' ., 
the world on our own from the beginning. 
The foregoing has a number of implications for an 
environmental ethic. To say that humans are dependent upon 
the world for our physical existence is obvious. We are, 
however, also dependent upon the world for our existence as 
uniquely individuated self-conscious beings. First, we are 
dependent upon the existence of things, external to our-
selves, as examples of permanence in time against which we 
Reason, refer to the volume and page number of Kants 
Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin and Leipzig: Prussian Academy 
Edition, 1902 - ) , 29 vols. 
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determine our own existence as continuous in time. The 
determination of experience with respect to time, according 
to Kant, presupposes something permanent in time against 
which the temporal determination of experience can be set. 
Kant points out, however, that this temporal permanence 
cannot be in me since it is only by means of a temporal 
permanence that I can determine my own existence in time. 
Therefore, a temporal permanence can only be recognized in 
terms· of·• something outside myself. 15 
As·I mentioned earlier, we become aware of ourselves as 
uniquely distinct selves.through the speech and actions of 
others even before we are capable of such speech and action 
ourselves. This self we come to know is an empirical self. 
This empirical self is experienced both in terms of internal 
sensations (I feel ... ) and external activity. It is an 
historical self. But for an ~mpirical self to be known, as 
a sum of experience, that sum of experience must be related 
to a single, particular, irreducible consciousness; i.e., 
the unity of apperception, the thinking-I. The empirical 
self, as a sum of experience related to a single, 
particular, irreducible consciousness, is a concept of an 
object. It is the result of cognitive activity that unites 
sensation and the understanding. Thus, the thinking-I, the 
unity of apperception, is the necessary ground of the 
empirical self. 
15Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B275; p. 245. 
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In the very young child, however, the mental state is 
first passive; merely a state o~ sensational receptivity. 
"[T]he time of early childhood is not a time of experiences 
but rather a time of mere sporadic perceptions which have 
not yet been unified by any real concept of an object. 1116 
After a time, however, the child moves from a passive to an 
active mental state. In the course of normal development 
the child comes to acquire concepts of things. This shift 
in mental activity is not only evidenced in the use of 
language, but is actually dependent upon it. Eventually the 
child acquires the concept, the thought, of an empirical 
self, and this is again evidenced by and dependent upon the 
use of the first-person pronoun. It is this progression 
from a passive to a fully active, cognizing mental state 
which Kant refers to when he states, "(a)t first the child 
merely felt itself, now it thinks itself. 1117 A child, 
however, does not accomplish this shift entirely on its own. 
As small children we must learn the use of the first-person 
pronoun, and we do so, at least in part, in response to the 
language of others which indicates our existence as 
16rmmanuel Kant, Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of 
View, rev. and ed. Hans H. Rudnick, trans. Victor Lyle 
Dowdell, with an Introduction by Frederick P. Van De Pitte 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), p. 
10; (7:128). 
17Ibid. , p. 9; ( 7: 12 7) . 
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selves. 18 It is interesting to 11ote that autistic children 
frequently refer to themselves in speech by use of the 
second or third-person pronoun. This practice has been 
explained "in psychoanalytic terms as a breakdown in the 
child's development of a sense of personal identity, a 
self."19 The world, which contains others as well as 
things, is, then, the ground against which we develop our 
awareness of ourselves as uniquely distinct individuals who 
possess a constancy in time. 
We are deperident upon this intersubjective world for 
our development as uniquely distinct, self-conscious beings, 
and the world, as a systematized world-whole, is dependent 
upon us. This world, int·o which we are born and in which we 
find ourselves, is a world which we construct in community. 
our construction is conditioned by the spatio-temporal 
characteristics of intuition; the categories of the 
understanding, and the Transcendental Ideas. Further, this 
construction of the world is an unending task aimed at, yet 
never attaining, thorough-going systematic unity. our 
knowledge of the world is, then, a limited knowledge, and 
the knowledge of ourselves for which it is the ground is 
likewise limited. To the extent that our knowledge of the 
18Jill G. de Villiers and Peter A. de Villiers, 
Language Acguisition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1978), pp. 262-263. 
19 b'd I 1 . , p. 263. 
world is limited, our ability to predict events and 
consequences is also limited. 
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There is, however, a greater significance to our 
possession of limited knowledge. On the one hand, if, 
rather than knowledge or even the capacity for knowledge, we 
possessed only instinct, we would be merely another form of 
animal life. Our actions would, in fact, not be actions. 
Rather than actions, we would be limited to responses to 
immediate, surrounding conditions like other animals. As I 
have already mentioned, questions of morality or ethical 
conduct simply do not pertain to the behavior of animals. 
Although we are animals in the sense that we are biological 
l'ife forms, we are, I contend, something more. 
On the other hand, if our knowledge were unlimited, we 
would possess the intuitive understanding of a divine 
being. 20 A divine being, in turn, possesses a holy or 
perfect will. 21 For a divine being, possessing perfect 
knowledge and a perfect will, there is no difference between 
what is the case and what ought to be the case. 
We, however, are neither like other animals nor like 
divine beings. We are, rather, rational beings; something 
more than the other animals but less than gods. As rational 
20Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B145; p. 161. 
21Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of The 
Metaphysic of Morals, trans. and with an Introduction by 
Mary J. Gregor, Foreward by H.J. Paton (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 57; (6:395-
396) . 
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beings our understanding is directed towards knowledge of 
the world; it is concerned with what is the case with regard 
to the sensible world. Our power of reason, however, can be 
directed towards determining what ought to be the case with 
regard to a possible world-whole. In other words, our power 
of reason makes ethics possible. 
Kant's Moral Theory 
As a result of Kant's theory of knowledge we find that 
we construct our world in community, and human existence is 
dependent upon existence within a human community in the 
world. We come to cognition in and through 
contradistinction of what and who is other. Further, just 
as our mental state moves from passive receptivity to active 
cognition as we develop, our physical state moves from 
relative passivity·in infancy to activity as we develop. We 
are beings,who act in-and:on the world. It will be seen 
that we exist as beings capable of acting freely; i.e., 
capable of self-determination. 
Kant's moral theory provides guidelines for thought 
about human action and organization aimed at producing 
individual lives that are moral, and public entities which 
strive toward the highest good. 22 The moral theory of Kant 
is aimed at transforming the conventional world, which we 
22R.egarding my interpretation and presentation of 
Kant's moral theory, I am particularly indebted to: William 
W. Clohesy, l'On Rereading the Categorical Imperative," 
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 10, no. 2 (Winter 1985): 
57-74. 
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constuct out of what is given to us through sensaton and 
received knowledge, into a system of ends compatible with 
the moral law. It will be seen that, for Kant, it is a duty 
for us to try to transform the world as it is given to us 
into a system of ends compatible with the moral law. It 
will be seen that, for Kant, ethics is not only possible but 
is necessary in order for us genuinely to be human beings. 
In his second Critique Kant argues that the concept of 
freedom, shown.only to be possible in the first Critique, is 
given greater validity'by our experience of the moral law.n 
It is the experience of the moral 'ought' which makes us 
aware of ourselves as beings capable of free choice. That 
which we commonly call 'conscience' is nothing more than the 
experience of the moral 'ought'. ''(C)onscience is practical 
reason holding man's duty before him.''~ The experience of 
the inner conflict between what we want to do and what we 
ought to do is what first makes us aware that we have the 
power to freely determine our actions. This experience of 
duty is, for Kant, an experience had by all human beings. 
"[E)very man, as moral being, has a conscience inherent in 
him."~ So it is that, while ''freedom is certainly the 
ratio essendi [the reason for the being) of the moral law, 
23Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. 
and with an Introduction by Lewis White Beck (New York: The 
Liberal Arts Press, 1956), p. 29; (5:30). 
24Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, p. 60; (6:399). 
~Ibid. 
the latter is the ratio cognoscendi [the reason for our 
knowing] of freedom. 1126 
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The experience of duty makes us aware of ourselves as 
free beings. This same experience of duty also makes us 
aware that we are obligated to a rule of conduct which holds 
for us as a law, that is, which holds for us universally and 
necessarily.u As sensible beings we are subject to 
efficient causality according to the laws of nature. Yet, 
when I experience a conflict between what I want to do and 
what I ought to do, I become aware of myself as a being 
subject to another form of causality and subject to a law 
other than a law of nature. I become aware that, as a moral 
being, I am subject to causality by freedom and to a law, 
the moral law, which arises within me. In other words, I 
find myself both subject of the moral law and also the 
source of that same law. Regarding the moral law, then, we 
are autonomous.u 
our experience of duty makes us aware of ourselves as 
subject to the moral law which commands us necessarily and 
universally. The moral law results in imperatives of action 
to which we are obligated. "An imperative is a practical 
rule which makes necessary an action that is in itself 
26rmmanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 4; 
(5:4). 
27Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, p. 36; (6:378). 
28rbid. , p. 41; ( 6: 3 8 2) . 
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contingent." As Kant points out, although we are beings who 
possess practical reason, we are also beings subject to 
"wants and sensuous motives. 1129 We are beings capable of a 
pure will but not possessing a holy will. It is, therefore, 
possible for us to have maxims which conflict with the moral 
law. Thus, the moral law does not describe our actions but 
commands·them. Once an action, which is in itself 
contingent, is made necessary by an imperative, the action 
is one which we are obligated to perform. Because our will 
is not holy, because our will can be affected by 
inclination, the relationship between the will and the moral 
law is "one of dependence under the name of 'obligation'. 1130 
Further, an action to which we are obligated is, for Kant, a 
duty. 31 Consequently, moral imperatives result directly in 
duties. 
A Kantian ethic is, then, an obligation-based ethic, 
not a rights-based ethic. Kant, however, is not silent on 
the subject of rights. For Kant, every duty gives rise to a 
single right "in the sense of a moral title. 1132 In Kantian 
terms, a right is legitimate only insofar as it has, as its 
determining ground, a duty. For Kant, 'ought' implies 'can' 
; 29Ibid. , p. 2 O; ( 6: 2 21) • 
30Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 32; 
(5:32). 
31Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, p. 21; (6:221). 
32Ibid. , p. 4 O; ( 6: 3 8 2) . 
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since to hold a person obligated to an action which is, in 
fact, impossible is to make an inappropriate demand on the 
person. If a right arises from a duty-to-self, a person, on 
the basis of the right, can claim freedom from outside 
interference or prevention in performance of the duty that 
is the ground of the right. If a right arises from a duty-
to-others, others can claim a right to the performance of 
the duty by the person for whom it is a duty. In other 
words, I can claim something as my right if and only if that 
'something' is first either a duty-to-myself or someone 
else's duty-to-others. It should be noted that a moral duty 
which gives rise to a right "in the sense of moral title," 
is markedly different from a juridical duty which gives rise 
to a right "to exercise compulsion. 1133 In other words, a 
juridical duty, a duty institutionalized as public law, is a 
duty involving an external action a person can be compelled 
to perform. The .performance of a moral duty "is based only 
on free self-constraint. 1134 
For Kant, "free self-constraint'' is possible because we 
possess both reason and will. This capacity for self-
legislation, which is the source of the moral law, is also 
the source of motivation for its actualization. our 
awareness of our capacity for self-legislation, our 
awareness of the law in us, gives rise to a feeling in us of 
33Ibid., pp. 40-41; (6:382). 
34Ibid~, p. 41; (6:382). 
respect both for the moral law itself and for ourselves as 
sources of the moral law. 
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While Kant grants that respect is a ·(subjective) 
feeling, he holds that it is a feeling of a special sort, 
distinctly different from feelings of inclination or fear. 
He argues that respect, properly understood, "is regarded as 
the effect of the law on the subject and not as the cause of 
the law."~ Respect for the law, as the effect of the law, 
is, then; the one feeling which can motivate our action 
without undermining the universal character of a categorical 
imperative. Respect for ourselves, as potential sources of 
the moral law, is but another form of respect for the law 
itself. 36 
As individual free beings, beings capable of 
determining: our ac.tions other than according to a law of 
nature, we are capable of setting for ourselves a virtually 
infinite number of goals or 'ends'. It is quite possible, 
and frequently the case, that the ends we set are not 
consistent or compatible with each other. It"is perfectly 
35Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of 
Morals, trans. and Analyzed by H.J. Paton, The Academy 
Library (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 69; (4:401). 
36Although H. J. Paton translates "Achtung" as 
"reverence," I have substituted "respect" due to Kant's 
statement in the. third Critique that the feeling we 
experience when we·realize "it is beyond our ability to 
attain to an idea that is£ law for us is RESPECT." See 
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment: Including the First 
Introduction, trans. and with an Introduction by Werner s. 
Pluhar, with a Foreward by Mary J. Gregor (Indianapolis: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), p. 114; (5:257). 
45 
possible that I will set ends for myself which conflict with 
each other. Further, the ends which I set may also conflict 
with those ends set by other individuals. Due to our 
inherent sociality and freedom, the process of living as 
individuals in a common world forces upon us two questions: 
"What ought I do?" and "How ought we to live?" For Kant, 
the answers to both questions are to be reached through a 
process of critical thought. 
Productive imagination makes it possible for us to draw 
upon and synthesize experience so as to envision future 
results of proposed actions. Productive imagination coupled 
with freedom of choice and speech allows us to conceive 
purposive plans of action. Just as productive imagination 
allows us to envision the future results of our actions, 
productive imagination also allows us to envision a world 
changed as a result of our action. We are, thus, able to 
act purposively in the world. 
The formulation of purposive plans of action and the 
ability to set them in motion are manifestations of the 
twofold character of the human will. For Kant, will is both 
Wille and Willkuer; it is both reason and initiative. 37 Now 
reason may be either theoretical or practical in character. 
Theoretical reason is directed at the production of a 
sensible world-whole. Practical reason is directed at the 
production of an intelligible; i.e., moral, world-whole. It 
37rmmanuel Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 9-10; (6:212). 
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is possible for us, through practical reason and will, to 
strive to transform the sensible world into a moral world-
whole. For Kant, this transformation of the sensible world 
into a moral world-whole, albeit an ideal, is the goal of 
the moral law and the "model for the determination of our 
will. u38 
As we live in and gain experience of the world, we are 
able to comprehend more fully our effect upon it. In order 
to transform the sensible world into a moral world-whole, it 
is necessary for us to enijage in critical thought. Critical 
thought is characterized by three (related) elements: 
unprejudiced thought, enlarged thought, and consistent 
t~ought. 39 A moral world-whole is not a world ordered only 
according to physical well-being and instrumental values; 
i.e.-, values that are 'goods' because they are good for 
something else. Rather, it is a world also ordered 
according to mor~l' well-being an~ unconditioned values; 
i.e., values that are good in themselves, values that are 
ends. 
As already mentioned, the experience of duty makes me 
aware of myself as both free and subject to a moral law 
which, as law, holds necessarily and universally. In other 
38rmmanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 45; 
{5:43). 
39Immanuel Kant, 
(5:294}. Also see 
{7:228}. 
Critique of 
Immanuel Kant, 
Judgment, p. 
Anthropology, 
160-161; 
p. 128; 
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words, "What ought I do?" is the equivalent of "What ought 
anyone in the same situation do?" We are able to seek 
answers to these questions due to our capacity for critical 
thought. .. The very. effort of seeking answers for ourselves 
is to engage in unprejudiced thought, it is "to think for 
oneself." 
The possibility of moving, in thought, from "What ought 
I do?" to "What ought anyone in the same situation do?" is 
due to our capacity for enlarged thought. Further, this 
ability "to think from the.standpoint of everyone else," 
Kant held to be a potential capacity of all human beings. 
"[T]o think from the standpoint of everyone else'' is to 
think from a standpoint removed from personal interest. 40 
It is to think from a distanced perspective; i.e., 
impartially. It is to think in a manner such that, personal 
interest having been placed in perspective or even overcome, 
any rational being, also holding personal interest in· 
abeyance, would understand the reasoning and concur. In 
other words, if my choice is the result of enlarged thought, 
I ought to be able and willing to render an account of it to 
any rational being and expect the other to understand my 
reasoning. 
Even private moral actions, in terms of the 
deliberation which precedes them, have a public character. 
Others are present, at least in thought. To hold others 
40Ibid. 
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present in thought also serves to help render thought 
consistent. Consistent thought is thought that fits into a 
larger account of one's life and aims. To think 
consistently is to think in a way that the thinker would be 
willing to explain to others if necessary. It is unlikely I 
would willingly explain my own inconsistent thought 
p~blicly. 
Further, these three characteristics (unprejudiced, 
enlarged, consistent) of thought seem to point towards 
thought for which a thinker can be held accountable. If I 
think for myself, if I think from an enlarged perspective, 
and if I think in a way that is consistent, then I am 
g~nuinely the author of my thought and can be held 
accountable for.my thought. There is, then, implicit in 
Kantian moral theory a need for thought that is 
unprejudiced, enlarged, and consistent. 
Thought that is unprejudiced, enlarged, and consistent 
results in a process of critical thought for devising and 
evaluating human action. Such a critical thought process is 
central to a moral theory in which morality is grounded in 
autonomous deliberation rather than preset or given rules of 
action. Such a critical thought process is inherent in 
Kant's moral theory as evidenced by the formulation of the 
Categorical Imperative as: "'Act only on that maxim through 
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which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law. ' 1141 
As already mentioned, as free beings we are capable of 
setting a virtually infinite number of ends and plans of 
action for achieving them. The great variety of possible 
ends is due to our existence as uniquely distinct 
individuals. Because each of us differs to a degree from 
every other, our personal (subjective) desires also differ 
in at least some cases. In other words, what I want (based 
on subjective desire) may well, and very likely, differ from 
what you want (based on your subjective desires). Now ends 
are determined as the result of an act of choice. According 
t? Kant, a choice "determined only by inclination (sensuous 
impulse, stimulus)" is an example of "animal choice." A 
"human choice," however, while it can be "affected by 
impulses," can only be determined by reason. Reason, as the 
determination of choice, may be either reason-affected by 
impulses ("human choice'') or pure reason. If it is the case 
that pure reason is the determining ground, the result is a 
"free choice. 1142 We are, then, capable of three kinds of 
choices: "animal choice," "human choice," and "free 
choice." Pure reason, as the determining ground of a ''free 
choice," is reason unaffected by impulse or personal 
inclination. A "free choice" is a choice determined by 
41Immanuel Kant, Groundwork, p. 8 8 ; ( 4 : 4 21) . 
42Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, p. 10; (6:212). 
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reason from which all personal interest has been removed. A 
"free choice" is a choice which can be expected from any 
rational being also choosing according to pure reason. It 
is, in other words, a choice which is universally valid for 
rational beings. In this way, critical thought makes the 
decision of an individual applicable to all. As a living, 
acting individual, faced with the question of what I ought 
. 
to do, I am able, through critical thought, to arrive at an 
answer which, although the result of individual thought, 
concerns all rational beings. 
It is interesting to note that, while Kant grants that 
a "human choice" can be "affected by impulses," it cannot be 
d~termined only by impulses. A choice determined only by 
impulses is, by Kantian definition, an "animal choice." 
such unthinking choices are more akin to reactions. 
Reactions are certainly a part of human life and appropriate 
within certain contexts. If I touch something very hot, for 
example, I will, without thinking, pull my hand away. If I 
trip and suddenly lose my balance, I will, again without 
thinking, put out my hands in an effort to keep from 
falling. These kinds of automatic, unthinking reactions are 
examples of llanimal choice," and, as such, are appropriate 
insofar as we are animals; i.e. , · sensible beings. In fact, 
many·such responses are life-sustaining; e.g., my 
(automatic) blinking when a tree branch slaps my face. As 
free beings, beings who experience duty, however, we are 
something more than just animals. 
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"Human [but not "free"] choices," as the determining 
ground of actions, result in the setting of subjective ends; 
i.e., ends chosen in accordance with personal inclination. 
Now any plan I formulate as a means to achieve a subjective 
end will, as a guide for action, result in a hypothetical 
imperative. It will be a plan which can hold for me only so 
long as I desire the 'end'. Such a plan can hold for others 
only if they have each set the same end for themselves. 
Hypothetical imperatives, being grounded in inclination, 
cannot provide rules for action characterized by the idea of 
~oral necessity entailed in the concept of law. It must be 
remembered that, according to Kant, the setting of an end is 
an act of:choice~ Kant argues that, although I may compel 
another person to perform an act as a means to my end, I 
cannot compel another person to set my end as his end. I 
can set ends only for myself.~ 
If, however, I set an end and make a decision for 
action through critical thought (I set an end by means of a 
"free choice''), the result will be a categorical imperative. 
Having set aside or overcome personal inclination in setting 
an end and making a decision for action, I have set an end 
which can hold universally; i.e., categorically. The maxim 
of my action can, likewise, hold universally. That is, the 
43Ibi' d., 38 (6 380) p. ; : . 
maxim of my action can hold as a law for all rational 
beings. 
law. 
In this way critical thought results in a moral 
. . . 
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As a free being acting in the world, when confronted by 
a situation which prompts the q~estion of what I ought to 
do, I can, through critical thought, arrive at a maxim for 
action that can hold as a moral law. My maxim for action, 
precisely because it can hold as a moral law, commands me 
even as it has its source in me (in my practical reason). 
In this way I am both author and subject of the moral law. 
I am morally autonomous. When, by means of practical reason 
and will, I both legislate a universally valid moral law and 
~old myself to obey the law I have legislated, I hold myself 
responsible for the law and accountable to it. 
The grounding of morality in moral autonomy sets 
Kantian moral theory apart from all other previous forms of 
ethics. Under a Kantian ethic, what is morally good is not 
determined according to the action itself or its result. 
What marks the morally good is the critical thought process 
itself. This shift in emphasis, from act or outcome, to 
actor both results from and points to the unique condition 
of human beings as the sole possessors of intrinsic worth. 
For Kant, morality is grounded in autonomy; the moral life 
is a life lived according to universal moral law which has 
its source in our capacity to be morally autonomous, self-
legislating persons. So it is that, for Kant, the only 
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'good' which, is unconditionally good is a good will; i.e., a 
will determined by practical reason. 44 
The shift in emphasis from act or outcome to actor is 
evidenced by the purely formal character of the Categorical 
Imperative as quoted earlier. The Categorical Imperative 
does not give a law for actions but only a law for 
determining the maxims of our actions. It speaks of a 
thought process concerning actions. Our actions, and the 
deliberations which precede them, however, occur in the 
world; they occur in contexts. In the process of living as 
specific individuals we are confronted by specific 
problematic situations. The fact that Kant is aware of this 
fs evidenced by his statement, "ethics, because of the play-
room it allows ... inevitably leads judgment to pose the 
question of how a maxim should be applied in particular 
cases. 1145 In other words, the Categorical Imperative tells 
me how I ought to think when deciding upon action; it does 
not tell me which action to take. The decision as to which 
specific action to take in a specific situation is, 
ultimately, made by the individual. In this way the 
categorical Imperative requires the moral actor to use her 
or his judgment in determining what (specifically) ought to 
be done. So it is that Kant, concerning virtue as the 
exercise of our moral power, says 
44Immanuel Kant, Groundwork, p. 61; ( 4: 3 9 3) . 
45Immanuel Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, p. 73; (6:410). 
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Virtue is always in progress and yet always beginning 
from the beginning.--It is always in progress because, 
considered objectively. it is an ideal which is 
unattainable, while yet our duty is constantly to 
approximate to it. That it is always beginning anew 
has a subjective basis in human nature, which is 
affected by inclinations under whose influence virtue 
can never settle down in peace and quiet, with its 
maxims adopted once and for all--unless it is climbing, 
it inevitably sinks.~ 
Under a Kantian ethic, then, there are no prescribed or 
preset rules of action, only rules of thought about action. 
Although the moral law commands necessarily and universally, 
application of the law in specific contexts by specific 
moral actors requires that moral thought be continuously 
renewed if the moral life is to remain moral. 
The experience of duty makes us aware of ourselves as 
subject to the moral law. The moral law, as law, commands 
necessarily and universally; thereby subordinating personal 
inclination to practical reason~ That is, the moral law 
subordinates us, as sensible beings subject to sensible 
wants and needs, to an existence as free beings under the 
moral law. To say that we are free beings under the moral 
law is to say that we are morally autonomous; we are 
exemplifications of the only unqualified 'good'; i.e., the 
'good will'. For Kant, what is distinctly human is the 
ability to set ends according to reason rather than 
inclination. We have, as human beings, a duty to raise 
ourselves from "the crude state of (our) nature, from (our) 
46rbid., p. 71; (6:408). 
animality ... and to realize ever more fully ... the 
humanity by which (we) alone (are) capable of setting 
ends."~ In other word~, we have a duty to be moral, as 
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well as sensible, beings. The experience of duty makes us 
aware of ourselves as both free beings and as beings subject 
to the moral law. 
our capacity for morality is due to our ability to 
determine our will according to practical reason. A will 
determined according to practical reason is a good will. 
Regarding the 'good will', Kant says, ''[i]t is impossible to 
conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, 
which can be taken as good without qualification, except a 
good will. " 48 Objects, talents and skills are good only in 
context; they are 'good for' something. It is not so with 
the good will. Rather than being good in context, the good 
will provides the moral context in terms of which other 
things are or are not good. 49 The good will, however, is 
not something which exists separate and apart from human 
beings. Because we have the potential to set ends according 
to reason rather than inclination, we have the potential to 
possess wills that are unconditionally good. So it is our 
potential for morality which is the ground for our intrinsic 
worth. It is our potential for morality which makes us 
.
47Ibid., pp. 45-:-46.i (6:386). 
48rmmanuel Kant, Groundwork, p. 61; (4:393). 
49c1ohesy, "On Rereading the Categorical Imperative," 67. 
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ends-in-ourselves, persons rather than mere things. Things 
have only instrumental value. Because we are persons, and 
not just things, we have the potential to set our own ends. 
Thus, we ought not be treated merely as means towards 
someone else's end. Inasmuch as we do not want to be 
treated as mere things, we ought not treat anyone else as a 
mere thing. This is reflected in Kant's further formulation 
of the categorical Imperative as: "'Act in such a way that 
you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always 
at the same time as an end. I 1150 
Kant's presentation of his moral theory, with its heavy 
stress on motive, has led readers to criticise the ethic as 
unconcerned with consequences. But it is a misreading, I 
contend, to say that Kantian moral theory ignores 
consequences. For Kant, morality is grounded in autonomy. 
The moral actor, through critical thought, arrives at a 
maxim of action that qualifies as a moral law. The action 
is moral because it arises out of practical reason, and not 
because of the consequence it brings about. But that is not 
to say that there is no interest in the consequence of an 
action. Kant holds that we have a duty to cultivate all our 
natural capacities. Kant says, concerning the moral 
individual, "it is his duty to diminish his ignorance by 
education and to correct his errors .... morally-practical 
50Immanuel Kant, Groundwork, p. 96; (4:429). 
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reason commands it absolutely and makes this end his 
duty. 1151 In other words, we ought to learn from our 
mistakes and apply this improved knowledge to future 
efforts. This can hardly be the case if Kant intends us to 
ignore consequences. Further, in a Kantian ethic, actions 
and ends (the consequences of actions) are inextricably 
linked. "An end is an object of free choice ... Every 
action, therefore, has its end. 1152 Because the will is 
Willkuer, as well as Wille, action is inherent in Kant's 
moral theory. Because action is inherent in the Kantian 
ethic, and action always entails an end, the Kantian ethic 
can hardly be blind to ends. Kant's moral theory, grounding 
' ' 
m?rality in autonomy, does spare the actor from moral 
responsibility for genuinely unforeseeable consequences. We 
are, afterall, beings of limited knowledge. 
Kant's stress on consistency of thought within his 
moral theory might also lead a reader to another 
misinterpretation. It is possible, though incorrect, to 
read the Categorical Imperative as if mere 
universalizability of a maxim were sufficient to make it a 
moral law. In other words, it is possible to misread the 
Categorical Imperative as if it meant that, as long as I am 
willing to let everyone else do what I do, what I do is 
51Immanueal Kant, Doctrine of Virtue, pp. 45-46; (6:385-
386) . 
52 b'd I 1 • , p. 3 8 ; ( 6: 3 8 o) and p. 4 3 ; ( 6 : 3 8 3 -3 8 4) . 
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moral.· As already mentioned, Kant does hold that there is 
one, u_nconditioned good; i.e., the good will. The good will 
is not merely good in context, but, rather, establishes the 
context in terms of which other things, as ends and 
practical initiatives, are judged. 
The good will makes present in the world persons who 
act freely through the moral law. Due to our distinctly 
human potential to set ends for ourselves, we are ends-in-
ourselves. Because we have the potential, not merely to set 
ends for our~elyes, but to set ends according to practical 
reason, we have the potential to possess wills that are 
unconditionally good. It is as beings who are ends-in-
themselves and who are potentially capable of possessing 
good wills that we have intrinsic worth. so it is that the 
mere_universalizability of a maxim of action is not 
sufficient to constitute the maxim as a moral law. Any 
maxim of action needs to meet the requirement of treating 
persons as ends-in-themselves, not merely as means. Things 
are means_only, entities inherently incapable of setting 
their own ends. Persons, on the other hand, are capable ~t 
having their own ends, of being ends-in-themselves. 
According .to Kant, we have a duty to recognize and respect 
the intrinsic worth of others, as well as of ourselves. 
, ~ ' .. ' ' 
Failure to respect another person as a person, as a being 
possessing intrinsic worth, is to treat a person as a thing. 
It is to make an exception of the person so treated. Such 
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exception-making, other than in rare and limited cases, is 
incompatible with the requirement of consistency in critical 
thought. 
Critical thought, being thought from a distanced 
perspective, leads the thinker to view herself in relation 
to others. Recognizing the intrinsic worth of others, as 
well as herself, the thinker is brought into association 
with other persons as equals. Because each is morally 
autonomous, all are equal under the moral law. Because all 
persons are ends-in-themselves, each is deserving of respect 
and consideration. Critical thought, then, brings us to a 
view of ourselves as morally autonomous persons who ought to 
' ' 
strive towards "a systematic union of different rational 
beings ... a whole of all ends in systematic conjunction 
(a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and 
also of the personal ends which each may set before 
himself) ."53 In this way, we are able to strive towards a 
transformation of the sensible world into a moral (and 
ideal) world-whole, Kant's "realm of ends. 1154 We can 
envision, and act to try to bring about, a community of 
moral beings. 
As previously stated, Kant's moral theory requires 
thought that is unprejudiced, enlarged, and consistent as 
53rmmanuel Kant, Groundwork, pp. 100-101; (4:433). 
5
~bid., p. 100; (4:433). Although H.J. Paton 
translates 'Reich' as 'kingdom,' I follow the practice of 
Lewis White Beck in translating 'Reich' as 'realm'. 
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fundamental for thought about human action and as necessary 
in order for our wills to be good wills. The good will, as 
the only unconditioned good, grounds morality in moral 
autonomy. The good will, thought and action determined 
according to practical reason, works toward the 
transformation of the sensible world into a moral world-
whole. Further, this transformation is not just a possible 
activity, but a duty for us. 
We do not, however, live and act only as private 
individuals. Human existence is necessarily existence in 
community. Critical thought is needed, not only for thought 
concerning private actions, but in public discourse 
concerning public action under a system of law. 
As beings subject to causality through freedom, we 
possess the capacity to set our own ends. Because we 
possess the potential to set ends in accordance with 
practical reas6n, we are capable of moral autonomy. As 
morally autonomous individuals we are all deserving of equal 
respect. Because we are all capable of critical thought, we 
are ill capable of participating, or of being prepared to 
participate, ·in a political system in which public discourse 
is a necessary part of the decision-making process; in which 
public action is determined publicly. 
For Kant, human existence is necessarily existence in 
community. As members of a community we come to the 
recognition of our interconnectedness and interdependence. 
Each of us requires others in order to survive, much less 
prosper. As we become aware of our dependence upon the 
community in which we exist, we also become aware that the 
community as a community has goals distinct from our 
personal goals. These communal goals are public ends or 
interests. 
By 'public interests' I do not mean the sum of the 
private interests of all the members. Rather, 'public 
interests' signifies the goals and values desired by the 
members of the whole as a whole. Public interests are the 
goals through and around which communities are formed. 
Public interests are the reflections of a people's view of 
themselves .9..§. ~ people. They are the means by which we 
define ourselves as a community. 
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To engage in public discourse is to subject one's 
thinking to 1i'the, test of free and open examination. 1155 
Thought from a strictly personal perspective, thought that 
is not enlarged, is unlikely to withstand public 
examination. If what I propose that we do is based only on 
my personal perspective, it is unlikely to accord with the 
perspectives of the others who, along with me, constitute 
the 'we'. By engaging in public discourse concerning public 
action (action as a community), the participating members of 
55rmmanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Axi; p. 9. 
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a community are brought to "a common perspective drawing 
individuals into a supportive community. 1156 
Engagem~nt iri public discourse is the making public of 
what, initially, was private thought. By making our 
(initially) private thoughts public, we expose them, not 
only to public examination, but to public confirmation or 
refutation. In this way, engagement in public discourse 
concerning public action makes our political decisions 
dependent upon public examination and approval. The goals 
of the community as a community are determined by the 
members as a community. 
Engagement in public discourse fosters the emergence of 
a people .9..§. a people. Although each of us begins by seeing 
the world from a distinctly personal perspective, each of us 
is also capable of taking a distanced perspective. By 
engaging in pµblic discourse concerning public actions we 
are brought to a perspective that is not only distanced but 
common. 
The very act of rendering thought public implies that 
the thinker can give an account of her thought. This is not 
an 'account' in the sense of a simple recounting of the way 
her thought happened to proceed. Rather, it is a reasoned 
explication of what was, itself, reasoned thought. 
56william w. Clohesy, "From the State of Nature to the 
U.S. Constitution?" in The American Constitutional 
Experiment, ed. David M. Speak and Creighton Peden 
(Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1991), p. 22. 
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Rendering my thought public, making it subject to public 
examination, implies that I can present a rational 
explanation of why I think as I do. The thinker thus takes 
responsibility for the thought. 57 According to Kant, as 
individuals in association, engagement in public discourse 
concerning public action is necessary for our public actions 
to be just. By engaging in public discourse we are brought 
to thought which is not based only on our private 
perspectives, and thereby we make and hold ourselves 
collectively responsible and mutually accountable for our 
actions. 
It is reasonable to expect that participation by an 
individual in public discourse, though it begin from a 
thoroughly individual point of view, will lead eventually to 
an enlarged view. If the thought I make public always 
reflects my individuc1l standpoint alone, I will find my 
thought constantly rejected by others as idiosyncratic. My 
thought concerning public action is thus subject to public 
confirmation as is my thought concerning knowledge of the 
world. Just as intersubjective confirmation leads to a 
common view of the sensible world, public discourse 
concerning public action leads to a common view of public 
interests. 
57Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political 
Philosophy, ed. and with an Interpretive Essay by Ronald 
Beiner (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982}, p. 
41. 
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By grounding public action, action as a community, in 
public discourse, we reinforce our dependence as individuals 
on the community. We cannot bring about public action as 
private individuals but only as members of the publid. By 
grounding public action in public discourse we make 
necessary the generation of a common, public view of 
ourselves and our public interests. We become a system of 
citizens, rather than an aggregate of individuals. By 
engaging in public discourse; we are brought to an 
understanding and an appreciation of the perspectives of 
others, and they, in turn, are brought to an understanding 
and appreciation of our perspective. The final result is 
tpe generation of a common perspective. Further, the 
grounding of public action in public discourse results in 
the need for consensus prior to public action. 
By organizing as a community which grounds public 
action in public discourse we join together as a people. We 
find that we do not relinquish our freedom but, rather, 
create another kind of freedom--the freedom of political 
participation. "The formation of communities around 
projects marks the creation of political power. 1158 
The process of critical thought inherent in Kant's 
moral theory, when applied to public action, leads to a form 
of government grounded in freedom (unprejudiced thought), 
58clohesy, "From the State of Nature to the U.S. 
Constitution?" p. 31. 
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equality (enlarged thought), and a common body of law 
(consistent thought). A governmental form so grounded 
respects the intrinsic worth of all (equality), recognizes 
all its citizens as equally capable of moral autonomy 
(freedom), and does not make exceptions on an arbitrary 
basis (a common body of law). Kant holds a republican form 
of government to be the only morally acceptable form due to 
its foundational principles of freedom, equality of 
citizens, and a body of common law. 59 In other words, the 
republican form of government is grounded in thought that is 
enlarged, unprejudiced, and consistent. Kant thus holds 
that the only morally acceptable form of government is the 
republican form; a form characterized by a separation of 
legislative and executive powers. Only a republican 
constitution springs "from the pure source of the concept of 
law; 11 i.e., from reason. 60 • In this way, a republican 
constitution shares the. same source as the moral law. 
The republican form of government is characterized by a 
separation of legislative and executive powers. Because the 
legislative power lacks the power of enforcement, it is not 
spared from obeying the laws it makes. At the same time, 
because the executive power cannot legislate, it can execute 
59Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical 
Sketch,'' in Kant Selections, ed. and with an Introduction by 
Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 
1988), p. 434;, (8:350). 
60Ibid. , p. 4 3 4; ( 8: 3 51) . 
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only those laws made by the legislative body. Each body is 
both necessary for and dependent upon the other; public laws 
without enforcement soon become meaningless, public 
enforcement without public law is despotism. Because both 
bodies are composed of individuals, and because individuals 
frequently differ from each other in terms of their 
perspectives, in order for such mutually dependent bodies to 
accomplish anything, ends must be set by mutual agreement; 
i.e., the various perspectives of the individuals must give 
way to a common perspective. 
The elected representatives under the republican form 
of government cannot merely reflect the private interests of 
the constituents. If the representatives only reflect the 
interests of their constituents, factionalism is the result. 
It is the case, rather, that representatives ought to work 
towards a common. view of .the country's interests. Further, 
the representatives ought to take the perspectives of others 
back to their constituents. "A system of discourse should 
take place both horizontally among those in government and 
vertically between representatives and the electorate. "61 
Kant's moral theory recognizes that we exist as both 
private individuals .who set private ends and as individuals 
in association capable of setting public ends. The 
accommodation of private to public ends is the vision of 
61clohesy, "From the State of Nature to the U. s. 
Constitution?" pp. 34-35. 
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Kant's "realm of ends." Recognizing myself as a member of a 
community, and recognizing the public ends of the community 
as a community, I also recognize my need to accommodate some 
of my private ends to the community's public ends. This 
synthesis of private and public ends is also the goal of 
republicanism as envisioned by Kant. The accommodation of 
private to public interests is the goal of public discours~. 
Any political action which requires secrecy for success is, 
perforce, unacceptable. Whatever is done politically, if it 
is to be just, must be done publicly. This leads to Kant's 
first "transcendental formula of public law" which states: 
"'All actions relating to the right of other men are unjust 
if their maxim is not consistent with publicity. 11162 
If public discourse concerning political action is not 
merely possible but necessary for the form of governmental 
organization, we are brought to a state of affairs similar 
to the "realm of ends". Kant's first "transcendental 
principle of public law" makes public defensibility the 
yardstick of just political action. According to Kant, a 
political action which cannot withstand public examination 
is, perforce, unjust. In other words, if the actor 
(political body, official) cannot render to the public a 
rational account of the action, the action is inherently 
unjust. As Kant points out, however, this is only a 
negative principle. It provides a definition of what 
62Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 454; (8:381). 
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constitutes unjust political action. Kant's second 
"transcendental principle of public law" states: "'All 
maxims which stand in need of publicity in order not to fail 
their end agree with politics and right combined.' 1163 This 
principle is affirmative in character. In other words, if a 
political action cannot withstand publicity, it is unjust. 
If, however, a political action needs publicity in order to 
accomplish its goal, it is definitely just and moral. If a 
political action needs publicity for success, it "must 
accord with the public's universal end, happiness. 1164 The 
fact that a political action which requires publicity for 
success "must accord" with the happiness of the members of 
the public is due to the very nature o.f happiness. Private 
happiness can be defined as "the opportunity to go about 
one's own affairs in peace. 1165 In other words, private 
happiness is the freedom to act as a private individual. 
Our actions as private individuals differ nearly as much as 
we do as individuals. It is not at all surprising, then, 
that private happiness for one individual can be quite 
different from the private happiness of another. 
By organizing as a people which grounds public action 
in public discourse, we become a community with a common 
63Ibid., p. 457; (8:386). 
64Ibid. 
65clohesy, "From the State of Nature to the U.S. 
Constitution?" p. 25. 
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view, a public with public interests. Public actions which 
are grounded in public interest reflect the common view of 
the peopl~ as an org~nized body. The goal of public action 
grounded in public interest is "that laws and policy will 
express the enlarged common interest. 1166 In other words, 
public action grounded in public discourse serves to foster 
what is commonly called the general welfare. Further, this 
general welfare, because it is grounded in an enlarged, 
common interest, cannot be envisioned by any one person. 
Rather, it can only be defined and redefined by the members 
of the society through public discourse. 67 
The setting of national goals and values is one example 
of the kind of political action which requires publicity in 
order to succeed. For goals and values to be truly 
national, to be shared by all members of the public, they 
cannot be ~rbitrarily set by a leader. As already 
mentioned, however, one example of political leadership is 
the effort of helping to shape common, public views and 
values. In order for a political action to accord with 
public happiness, it must also accord with the rights of the 
memb~rs·of the.public.· Now, a political action which 
accords with tti~ iights of the members of the public, and 
which also accords with the happiness of that public, is an 
action which accords with and contributes to "the union of 
66rbid., p. 34. 
67Ibid. , p. 3 4. 
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the goals of all. 1168 A political system which works toward 
-
"the union of the goals of all" is a system of human 
organization which furthers human progress toward "a whole 
of all ends in systematic conjunction;" i.e., "the realm of 
ends." By engaging in public discourse we are brought to 
thought that is unprejudiced, enlarged, and consistent; we 
are brought to critical thought. Critical thought, 
necessary for Kant's moral theory, is engendered by his 
political theory. It is not surprising, then, that Kant 
viewed a just political organization as fostering morality. 
"A good constitution is not to be expected from morality, 
but, conversely, a good moral culture of a people is to be 
expected only under a good constitution. 1169 In other words, 
morality alone will not bring about the "realm of ends." 
The actualization of Kant's political Idea will, however, 
serve to advance us towards the realization of his moral 
Idea. 
The advancement of the realization of Kant's moral Idea 
by the actualization of his political Idea is due to the 
differences in the meanings of 'publicity' and 'compulsion' 
within each sphere of application. In the political 
application of Kant's moral theory, publicity is required; 
and it is publicity in the literal sense of the term. 
Political proposals must be made subject to public 
68rbid. 
69Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," p. 444; (8:366). 
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examination and testing. When Kant's moral theory is 
applied to private action, publicity is not required in 
actuality but only in possibility. I am not, in fact, 
required to explain publicly the moral maxims of my private 
actions; at least, not prior to acting. I should, however, 
be able to defend my moral maxims, regarding private 
actions, if called upon to do so. When Kant's moral theory 
is applied to private action, compulsion is respect for the 
moral law. It is not external compulsion as is the case 
when Kant's moral theory is applied to the public sphere. 
Quite the contrary, since the setting of an end is an act of 
choice, I cannot be compelled by another to set something as 
my end. According to Kant's moral theory, external 
compulsion regarding private moral action is contradictory. 
Kant's moral theory, in both of its fields of 
application, has a number of points of significance for an 
environmental ethic. The. utilitarian approach to nature 
criticized by Leopold treats nature as a means to human 
ends. But the human ends to which the utilitarian approach 
subordinates nature are ends for humans as sensible beings 
only. The utilitarian approach treats nature as good only 
insofar as nature satisfies our sensible needs and wants 
and, thus, at best, ignores our existence as moral beings. 
The moral theory of Kant is an obligation-based theory. 
The Kantian ethic is based on a decision-making thought 
process aimed at determining what we ought to do, not merely 
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what we can or may do. Its primary products are duties, 
which in turn give rise to rights. This is of special value 
with respect to an environmental ethic. 
In Constructions of Reason, Onora O'Neill argues that 
an obligation-based ethic is more successfully productive 
than a rights-based ethic for determining ethical behavior 
on the part of adults towards children. O'Neill argues that 
the scope of an ethical theory which takes rights as 
fundamental significantly differs from the scope of a theory 
which takes obligations as fundamental when evaluated in 
terms of the recipients. 70 I submit that her argument also 
applies when determining ethical behavior with regard to 
nature. 
' 
A significant point of difference between rights-based 
and obligation-based theories with regard to an 
environmental ethic concerns the nature of the recipients 
and the difference between an obligation and a right. For 
an obligation genuinely to exist, that is, to have binding 
power on an agent, it need only be recognized as such by the 
agent. The obligation does not need to be recognized by a 
recipient as something owed to her, him, or it. On the 
other hand, a rights-based theory, generally speaking, 
requires the moral agent to recognize the recipient as a 
right-holder in order for the relationship to have an 
70onora O'Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations 
of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), p. 188. 
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ethical component. In the event that the recipient 
recognizes himself as a right-holder when the moral agent 
does not, the right-holding recipient, it is expected, will 
be able to bring his claim to the attention of the moral 
agent. If it should be the case that a moral agent does not 
recognize a recipient as a right-holder, and if the 
recipient, for some reason, is incapable of bringing his 
claim to the attention of the moral agent, it may be 
possible for a third party to make the claim on behalf of 
the recipient. As O'Neill states, however, "[i]t is hard to 
see the point of according rights to agents whose freedom of 
action goes no deeper than uncoerced determination by 
natural causes."n 
I suspect that the foregoing statement was made with 
respect to fetuses and infants. As mentioned earlier, 
-action, in the sense of both praxis and arche, is grounded 
in the possession of a concept of self which, in turn, is 
dependent for its development upon existence and growth 
within a community of thinking actors. Fetuses and infants, 
not yet having developed such concepts of self, are not yet 
capable of action in the sense of praxis or arche. Rather, 
any action exhibited by a fetus or infant is action only in 
the sense of movement or instinctive response; i.e., "action 
[that) goes no deeper than uncoerced determination by 
natural causes." 
71Ibid., p. 195. 
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Now the question may be raised: Why not accord rights 
to entities capable only of action determined by natural 
causes? The answer lies in the meaning of 'right' itself. 
A complete history and explication of the various theories 
of rights is beyond the scope of this thesis. O'Neill's 
statement, however, indicates a view of 'right' that is 
linked to 'freedom'. In general, when we invoke the concept 
of 'right', we do so as a defense against external 
interference. A's right to do X means that, if P wishes to 
prevent A from doing X, the burden of justification is on P, 
not on A. In other words, what is primary is A's freedom to 
act, not P's power to interfere. This is the case even if 
A's right to do Xis claimed by another on behalf of A. But 
'right' in this sense does not apply if, in fact, A is 
inherently incapable of acting freely. Further, if we 
accord rights to entities incapable of acting freely, do we 
not run the risk of making 'right' meaningless? 
Now let us assume that a situation exists which 
involves a moral actor ('M') and a recipient ('R') incapable 
of acting freely. If we agree with O'Neill's position that 
it makes no sense to accord rights to an entity incapable of 
acting freely, we have a situation involving a moral actor 
'·,; 
and a right-less recipient. Let us further assume that the 
moral actor in our hypothetical situation recognizes herself 
as having a right to do something, to act in a particular 
way ('W'), towards the recipient. Finally, let us assume 
75 
that a third party observer ('T') does not concur with M's 
doing W to R. T cannot argue on behalf of R's right; R has 
no rights. From the point of view of R, it is a no win 
situation. At best, T can argue against M doing W to Ron 
the grounds that M's doing W will somehow violate T's right. 
The concern, the ethical focus, is with Mand T, not R. 
This is not to say that children do not have rights of 
any sort. Which rights, and at what age they are held, 
however, is a matter open to a great deal of discussion (and 
not the point of this thesis). The point which O'Neill 
wishes to make, rather, is that an obligation-based ethic 
can avoid some of these problematic situations. 
O'Neill's point serves well when applied to animals and 
nature overall. As already mentioned, animal life differs 
qualitatively from human life. Animal existence is not 
existence-as-an-individual precisely because, to the best of 
our knowledge, animals do not possess the concept of self 
necessary for existence-as-an-individual. Nature, in terms 
of non-conscious entities (mountains, rivers, etc.) and 
processes, is likewise incapable of action beyond "uncoerced 
determination by natural causes." 
This is not to suggest, however, that fetuses and 
infants are not significantly different from animals and 
nature in general. Although fetuses and infants do not 
possess concepts of self, they are, generally speaking, 
potential possessors of such concepts. Given time and 
existence within a community of thinking actors, it is 
generally presumed that all infants will, to some degree, 
develop concepts of self. This potential for the 
development of a concept of self is not shared by other 
animals, much less by non-conscious nature. 
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Finally, although it may be possible to develop a 
rights-based theory regarding nature without seriously 
devaluing the concept of 'right' as it applies to human 
beings, I contend that such an undertaking is not necessary. 
A Kantian, obligation-based theory can sufficiently defend 
nature from inappropriate human interference as will be 
seen. 
In summary, Kant's moral theory recognizes our 
intrinsic worth as arising out of our potential to be moral 
agents. This, in:turn, presupposes the presence of a world 
in which we can meaningfully act. As private individuals we 
may act individu~lly.n ~e are, however, necessarily, 
individuals in association. Action in association with 
others which is concerned with public ends is, inherently, 
public action. Public action may or may not involve the 
making of public laws. Action which arises out of the 
deliberation and activity of a group of people, and which is 
intended to affect the public sphere, is, I contend, public 
72As already mentioned, deliberation about private 
moral action does involve, at least in thought, others. 
Private moral action, as action, however, is action by an 
individual. 
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action even should its aim not be the making of public law. 
For example, organizations such as The Nature Conservancy, 
Habitat for Humanity, Amnesty International, etc. do not 
seek to enact law through their activities, yet their 
activities are aimed at the public weal. Such groups, 
through their activities, seek to improve the condition of 
the public. That is, such groups seek to foster, and 
oftentimes shape, public interests. Habitat, for example, 
does not only build housing for low-income persons, but, 
through this activity, also seeks to raise the public's 
consciousness regarding some of its less fortunate members. 
r~e Nature Conservancy engages in fund-raising campaigns in 
order to purchase, and thereby preserve, rare or threatened 
ecosystems. At the same time, the organization seeks to 
increase public awareness concerning the value of such 
ecosystems and the need to preserve them. Public action 
ought ~o be based on public discussion and impartiality. 
Public discourse, as a means of determining public action, 
serves to engender the critical thought process called for 
by Kant's moral theory. Further, Kant's moral theory, when 
applied to the sphere of public action, serves to bring us 
closer to the goal of a moral world-whole. As individuals 
acting freely in and on the world, we need a world in which 
to develop ~nd act. It will be seen that our conception of 
nature as purposive also results in a need for us as moral 
beings. 
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Kant's Theory of Teleological Judgments 
In the~thir~ c~itigue Kant characterizes the power of 
judgment, in general, as "the ability to think the 
particular as contained under the universal." If we are 
given a universal under which to subsume the particular, the 
subsumption is an act of determinative judgment. If, 
however, we are given only the particular, "judgment has to 
find the universal for it." The power of judgment to find 
universals is the power of reflective judgment.n Because 
reflective judgment does not involve given universals, it 
does not give attributes to objects; it does not determine 
what some thing is. Rather, reflective judgment tries to 
find universals. If reflective judgment is to search with 
any hope of success, it must not operate randomly, but 
according to·some principle. Further, reflective judgment 
cannot take its principle from experience since that would 
make the judgment determinative. Rather, reflective 
judgment must give a principle to itself. Because the 
principle which reflective judgment must give itself "is to 
be the basis for the unity of all empirical principles," yet 
cannot be taken from empirical principles, it needs to be a 
transcendental principle.~ Because this transcendental 
nimmanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment: Including the 
First Introduction, trans. and with an Introduction by 
Werner s. Pluhar, with a Foreward by Mary J. Gregor 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 18-
19; (5:179). 
74Ibid., pp. 19-20; (5:180-181). 
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principle is one which reflective judgment gives itself, it 
is only a regulative principle for human thought. In other 
words, when we are forced to reflect upon particulars for 
which we are given no appropriate universal, our power of 
reflective judgment gives to itself, as a law, a rule for 
reflection and subsumption. so it is that, while 
determinative judgment judges what something is, reflective 
judgment judges what something is for us due to 11 a 
peculiarity of our (human) understanding. 1175 
Kant argues that a view of nature as intentionally 
purposive is a universally valid, reflective judgment. 
Regarding Kant's use of the term 'purpose', he says, "when 
the special presentation of a whole precedes the possibility 
of the parts, then it is a mere idea; and when this idea is 
regarded as the basis of the causality, it is called a 
purpose. 1176 As mentioned earlier, the very system-building 
activity, with respect to the sensible world, which is the 
task of the understanding requires us to think of nature as 
having a logical arrangement. The a priori concepts of the 
understanding are of such a chara~ter that they make system-
building an irrepressible activity for the understanding. 
"To this extent, then; experience as such must be regarded, 
75r bid . , p . 2 8 9 ; ( 5 : 4 0 5 ) . 
76rbid. , p. 4 2 5; ( 2 o: 2 3 6) . 
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according to transcendental laws of the understanding, as a 
system and not as a mere aggregate. 1177 
As Kant points out, however, it does not follow from 
the above that actual experience of nature either must or 
will meet this requirement of our understanding. Kant 
realizes that the empirical laws of nature "might be so 
diverse and heterogenous that. we could never bring 
these empirical laws themselves under a common principle 
[and so] to unity. 1178 While the transcendental principles 
of the understanding give laws for the possible experience 
of nature, in the actual experience of nature we discover 
empirical laws. Such actual lawfulness on the part of 
nature cannot have, as its source, either human under-
standing or reason. "Neither understanding nor reason can 
provide a priori a basis for such [empirical] natural 
law."N It is thus necessary for us to posit, as a source 
of the actual lawfulness of nature, a rational source 
outside ourselves. In other words, due to the 
transcendental principles for our understanding, it is 
necessary for us to view nature as the product of a 
supersensible rationality. We cannot but approach nature as 
if it were the purposeful product of a non-human 
intelligence. This necessarily presupposed logical 
77Ibid., p. 397; {20:209). 
78rbid. 
79Ibid., p. 399; (20:210). 
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arrangement of nature Kant terms the logical purposiveness 
of nature. Kant argues, however, that in this sense, the 
logical·purposiveness is not a purposiveness in the actual 
forms of nature but only a purposiveness of the relations 
between and among the forms, as well as their suitability 
for a logical, empirical system of knowledge. In other 
words, as we experience the various forms in nature we find 
that the relationships which appear between and among them 
allow us, in accordance with the categories of the 
understanding, to fit these various natural forms into a 
logical system.· Because, at this level, the purposiveness 
is not a purposiveness in the forms of nature but only a 
purposiveness of nature for our cognitive powers, it is a 
strictly subjective purposiveness. 80 
This judgment of nature as subjectively, logically 
purposive is, however, a universally valid judgment. The 
construction of nature as a systematic unity requires the 
presupposition of~ logical arrangement of nature 
appropriate·to our cognitive powers. In other words, for 
the power of judgment to construct a system of nature out of 
experience, judgment must first assume that nature, in its 
actual forms, possesses a lawfulness appropriate to our 
understanding. The power of judgment requires, as an a 
priori p~inciple for judging nature, the concept of nature 
as lawful. This idea ~f nature as a logical system is the 
80I bid . , p . 4 O 4 ; ( 2 0 : 2 16 ) . 
principle which "first provides us, a priori, with the 
concept of a lawfulness that is' contingent objectively but 
necessary subjectively (for our cognitive power)-~the 
concept of a purposiveness of nature. 1181 
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This presuppo~ition of the logical purposiveness of 
nature is "necessary subjectively," i.e., necessary for all 
finite, rational beings. That is to say, due to the a 
priori character of our cognitive faculties; i.e., the 
(humanly) universal character of our cognitive faculties; 
each and every finite, rational being cannot but make this 
same presupposition. This presupposition is necessary in 
relation to our cognitive faculties even though it is not 
necessary in relation to nature in itself; i.e., nature as 
it is separate and apart from our perception and cognition 
of it. So it is that the judgment of nature as logically 
purposive is a judgment which is valid according to the 
intersubjective character of validity as set forth in the 
first Critique. 
This presupposition of the logical arrangement of 
nature appropriate to our cognitive power has its formal 
ground in the Transcendental Ideas of a rational source of 
the world and a world-whole. The Transcendental Idea of a 
world-whole implies that there is in nature an order whereby 
the manifold of particulars can be fitted into a systematic 
whole. The Transcendental Idea of a rational source of the 
81Ibid., p. 432; (20:243). 
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world, in turn, implies that nature, even in the particular, 
possesses ~-l~~fulness, an order, suited to our 
understanding. The particular which we discover needs to be 
subsumable under the universal. The necessity of this 
subsumption presupposes "a harmony between natural 
characteristics and our power of concepts. 1182 The 
presumption of this harmony is an a priori principle of 
reflective judgment and, thus, subjective. That is to say, 
the apparent harmony between nature and our understanding, 
nature's fitness for our understanding, "concerns a 
peculiarity of our (human) understanding in relation to the 
power of judgment and its reflection on things of nature. 1183 
• !) 
There is, however, an objective purposiveness of nature 
as well. According to Kant, that are two requirements which 
a natural thing must meet in order to be an objective 
natural purpose. ·"First, the possibility of its parts (as 
concerns both their existence and their form) must depend on 
their relation to the whole. 1184 In other words, the parts 
derive their full meaning only from the whole they form. 
Second, "the parts of the thing combine into the unity of a 
whole because they are reciprocally cause and effect of 
their form. 1185 Objective, natural purposes are, then, self-
82Ibid., p. 291: (5:406). 
83Ibid., p. 289; (5:405). 
84Ibid., p. 252; (5:373). 
85Ibid. 
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generating and self-sustaining; they are both organized and 
self-organizing.M 
All living things are such objective, natural purposes. 
Kant further argues that such a view of nature is necessary 
for our investigation of nature because a view of nature in 
strictly mechanistic terms fails to adequately explain such 
organized forms. Mechanisms, according to Kant, have only 
motive force. Living things, as organizing and self-
organized, have formative force. Thus, while a mechanistic 
approach to nature may be very useful for describing 
inorganic nature, a teleological approach is required in 
order to fully explain all of nature. It should be 
~emembered, however, that we are still dealing with 
judgments of nature made in accordance with the 
transcendental principle of reflective judgment; i.e., the 
purposiveness.of nature. 
All living things, as objective natural purposes, are 
instances of material purposiveness in nature. Here, the 
purposiveness is material in that it is found within the 
living thing itself, it is a purposiveness of parts to the 
whole and the whole to the parts. It is not a purposiveness 
which we give to the thing; i.e.·, a formal purposiveness, as 
is the.cas~ of .the purposiveness, for example, in geometric 
figures. 87 Our judgment of living things as instances of 
86:rbid. , p. 2 5 3; ( 5: 3 7 4) . 
87Ibid., pp. 239-241; (5:362-364}. 
objective material purposiveness, however, is still a 
universally valid reflective judgment in that it is a 
judgment that has, as an a priori principle, the 
purposiveness of nature. 
Now, materially objective purposiveness may be either 
intrinsic purposiveness or relative purposiveness. 
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Intrinsic purposiveness requires that the purposiveness of a 
living thing be considered, as an effect, as the product of 
art; i.e., as itself a purpose. In order for living things 
to be regarded as instances of intrinsic purposiveness, we 
would need to view nature itself as having an intelligent 
supersensible substrate. Relative purposiveness, on the 
-, ,\-. 
other hand, is purposiveness which, considered as an effect, 
is considered as the means to an end employed purposively by 
some other thing. 88 
If living things, as. natural purposes, are considered 
to have only relative purposiveness, then they (the living 
things) must be the means to some other end. Further, if 
all living things are considered to have only relative 
purposiveness, we face the problem of an infinite 
progression. An infinite progression, however, is in 
contradiction to the Transcendental Idea of a world-whole as 
the goal of the system-building activity of the 
understanding. In an infinite series (either progressive or 
regressive) every member of the series is conditioned by the 
88rbid., p. 244-245; (5:366-367). 
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next. such a series can never arrive at the idea of the 
unconditioned which our reason demands. 89 Relative 
purpcisiven~ss, to avoid an infinite progression, requires 
that there be at least one thing that can be considered an 
instance of intrinsic purposiveness; i.e., as an end-in-
itself. In other words, if we view nature as relatively 
purposeful, if each thing in nature is viewed as a means to 
some other thing's end, we must eventually arrive at some 
thing which is not a means to some other end. 
Traditionally, this last member of the series has been human 
beings. This approach, however, remains problematic if, as 
the last member of the series, we posit human beings as 
strictly sensible beings. If we take the view that nature 
exists to serve us, as sensible beings, if nature is there 
for oui ec6nomic or recreational benefit, we are still left 
with the question: Why should we exist, or continue to 
exist? In other words, human beings as the "ultimate end of 
nature" is insufficient as an end-in-itself. What is 
required is a "final end of nature." As shown in the 
preceding sectidri, fo~ Kant," on this earth only human beings 
as moral agents are ends-in-themselves. But if we are the 
final end for nature's purposiveness, then our relationship 
with and actions on n~ture must have an ethical component. 
The introduction of the concept of a "final end of 
nature," made necessary for us by reason's demand for the 
89I bid . , p . 2 8 5 ; ( 5 : 4 0 2 ) . 
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unconditioned, "leads us necessarily to the idea of all 
nature as a system in terms of the rule of purposes. 1190 In 
other words, we now find ourselves necessarily viewing the 
whole of nature as a system of ends directed toward its 
final end. Nature viewed as ,a system of ends,directed 
toward a final end is nature viewed as an organic whole. A 
system is not an aggregate, it is not a mere accretion. 
Rather, a system is an organized collection of parts which 
constitutes a whole due to internal organization and 
interrelation of the parts. A system of ends, then, is an 
organized body of ends in which individual ends, as the 
parts, are structured to produce a whole and derive their 
., ';, 
full meaning only in relation to the whole they form. Even 
that end which is the "final end" towards which all other 
ends are aimed is itself a part of the whole. Such a view 
of nature, with regard to an environmental ethic, leads to 
an ethic which is, perforce, wholistic. Each species in a 
natural system, then, can only be fully understood in 
relation to the system overall. Further, Kant argues that, 
even though some natural entities are not living things; 
i.e., not organisms, we are still allowed to view nature as 
a teleologic whole,because the existence of organisms in 
nature has already brought us to the idea of an intelligent 
supersensible substrate of nature. 91 
90rbid., p. 288; (5:379). 
91Ibid., pp 260-261; (5: 380-381). 
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Kant's position, which holds natural purposiveness to 
be relative:rather.than intrinsic,.makes necessary both a 
f~nal end for nature's purposiveness and a source, other 
than nature, for the concept of that purposiveness. As 
stated earlier, relative purposiveness, considered as an 
effect, is purposiveness employed as a means to an end by 
some other thing. Nature, as relative purposiveness, is, 
according to Kant, a means with regard to human beings as 
(final) ends. But if nature is so employed, its employment 
requires "some other thing." In other words, we need some 
thing, other than nature itself, considered as the source of 
purposive nature employed toward a "final end." Nature 
' " 
viewed as an organic whole, as a system of ends, cannot also 
be the source of its purposiveness. Nor can human beings. 
For us, the .purposiveness of nature is only a reflective 
judgment. Therefore, the "some other thing," which cannot 
be nature, which cannot be human beings, and cannot be 
phenomenal (we would then be dealing with a determinative 
judgment) must be a noumenon which is purposive. We are 
brought to the Transcendental Idea of a supersensible, 
rational source of the world. 
The foregoing, however, is not a proof of the existence 
of God. All that has been said concerning the teleological 
approach to nature is that this approach is a product of 
reflective judgment. We have not determined nature to be 
purposive, an organic whole directed towards human beings as 
its final end. All that has been established is that, for 
!!.§., as a regulative maxim for human thought, we cannot but 
view nature in this manner. 
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In summary, then, we cannot but view nature in 
teleological terms. Due to the inherent and unavoidable 
characteristics of human thought, we must approach nature as 
if it were the purposive product of a rational 
intelligence other than our own. Further, we can fully 
ground the relative purposiveness of nature in ourselves 
only insofar as we are moral agents and not merely 
phenomenal beings. 
Kant's theory of teleological judgments has two major 
points of significance with regard to an environmental 
ethic. The first of these concerns his argument for a view 
of nature as an organic whole. · As already mentioned, Kant 
views living things as both organized and self-organizing. 
The parts can be fully understood only in terms of the 
whole, and the whole is possible only because the parts are 
"reciprocally cause and effect of their form." Such 
language, in fact, reflects the organismic approach to 
biology and the current, general view of nature overall. As 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy points.out, regarding modern theories 
of biological development, llorganismic" has come to replace 
"teleological." An organism and its processes can be 
described physico-chemically "in principle." A physico-
chemical explanation is not, however, exhaustive. The parts 
90 
and processes within an organism are organized "in quite a 
peculiar manner" aimed at ''the maintenance, production, or 
restoration of the wholeness of the organism .... They 
[the parts and processes] must be considered from the 
standpoint of their significance for the maintenance of the 
organism.''~ Ecosystems, as 'wholes', are made up of 
various species of flora and fauna along with meteorological 
elements and cycles. Simultaneously, through the science of 
ecology, the parts of a given ecosystem are coming to be 
increasingly understood in terms of the whole which they 
constitute. In other words, Kant's argument for a 
~~leological approach to nature leads to a wholistic 
approach to nature. 
Perhaps of even greater significance for an 
environmental ethic is Kant's distinction of teleological 
judgments concerning nature as reflective judgments rather 
than determinative judgments. Teleological judgments about 
nature are subjectively valid; i.e., they are valid, 
reflective judgments. If, however, we err and view our 
teleological judgments about nature as objectively valid; 
i.e. as valid, determinative judgments; we are brought to 
the Aristotelian view of nature. Further, if we mistakenly 
treat our reflective judgments as though they were 
92r.udwig von Bertalanffy, Modern Theories of 
Development: an Introduction to Theoretical Biology, rev. 
ed., trans. and adapted by J. H. Woodger, The Academy 
Library (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1962), pp. 8-9. 
determinative judgments, nature as it seems to us is then 
mistaken for nature as it is. 
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Kant's moral theory, as discussed in the preceding 
section, results in a view of the world as necessary for 
humans as moral agents. Human beings as moral agents are, 
in turn, necessary in order for the purposiveness of nature 
to have a final end. Regarding an environmental ethic, 
Kant's theory of teleological (reflective) judgments 
regarding nature, I submit, leads human beings to have a 
superiority in nature but not over nature. Nature exists as 
a human construct. our existence, as biological life forms, 
ip obviously dependent upon nature. Our existence as moral 
beings, however, is also dependent upon nature. It is the 
experience of duty that first makes us aware of ourselves as 
beings capable of morality. Further, because the moral will 
is both Will~ and Willkuer, as moral beings we need the 
world as the arena in which we act. Because we are, to the 
best of our knowledge, the only beings on this planet 
capable of morality, our position:in nature is a position of 
superiority grounded in duty. To consider ourselves as 
superior over nature is to consider ourselves as separate 
and apart from'nature. This approach to nature views nature 
as 'other', an inferior 'other', which we are free to use, 
eradicate or ignore as we wish. This is the utilitarian 
view of nature. our position in relation to nature is a 
position in nature. As set forth in Kant's theory of 
92 
knowledge, nature is a product of the irrepressible 
organizational activity of human understanding. Although we 
come to know ourselves as selves in contradistinction to 
nature, we are neither separate nor separable from it. 
Kant's theory of teleological judgments brings us to a view 
of nature as a system of ends of which we are a part. We 
have a superior position as the final end of nature, but w~ 
are yet an end within the system overall. Because our 
superiority i,n nature is grounded solely in our capacity as 
moral agents, not as merely phenomenal beings, we are not 
justified in viewing nature as existing merely to satisfy 
our sensible wants and needs. As the final end of nature, 
~he end towards which all other ends are directed, we have a 
superiority within the whole of nature as a system of ends. 
We, as moral beings, are.the highest end of nature. Further 
support for such a non-utilitarian approach to nature is to 
be found in Kant's theory of aesthetics. 
Kant's Aesthetic Theory 
Kant holds that aesthetic judgments, like teleological 
judgments, are reflective. Kant argues that beauty, 
although grammatically a predicate, is not a property of any 
thing, but, rather, is a feeling we experience when we 
encounter some phenomena. While we speak as if 
beauty were external to ourselves, as if it were a property 
of an external object, this manner of speaking merely 
expresses how we feel when we are affected by an object we 
93 
judge as beautiful because of that same feeling. Further, 
beauty is a particular kind of inner sensation; it is a 
feeling arising from the free interplay between imagination 
and understanding. 93 Further, a judgment of beauty is 
characterized by four "moments." The four "moments" of a 
judgment of beauty correspond to the divisions of the 
categories of the understanding: quality, quantity, relation 
and modality. In this way, judgments of beauty are related 
to the understanding. 
Kant is careful to distinguish the difference between 
something judged to be beautiful and something judged to be 
either good or pleasing. For Kant, a judgment that 
something is good is a judgment determined by a concept. 
Something is judged good because it is good for some other 
thing. A judgment that something is good is, thus, a 
judgment ~hich employs the concept of purpose. 94 
A judgment of something as pleasing is, perforce, a 
judgment grounded in personal inclination. A judgment on my 
part that something is pleasing is a judgment that it is 
pleasing to me. Further, something is pleasing to me only 
insofar and precisely because it satisfies a personal 
inclination; i.e, a subjective desire. 95 A judgment, then, 
93rmmanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, p. 63; ( 5: 219) . 
94Ibid., p. 56; (5:213). 
95Ibid. , p. 55; ( 5: 212) . 
that something is pleasing is an inherently (private) 
subjective judgment. 
94 
Judgments of things as either pleasing or good are 
similar in the respect that both involve direct interest. 
"Interest is what we call the liking we connect with the 
presentation of an object's existence. 1196 In the case of a 
judgment of a thing as pleasing, the judgment involves 
direct interest in terms of personal inclination grounded in 
sensation. That is to say, I judge as pleasing something 
which I like with reference to sensation. In the case of a 
judgment of a thing as good, the direct interest involved is 
a rational interest. In other words, I judge as good that 
for which my liking has a rational ground. In both cases, 
the judgment involves a direct interest in the existence of 
the object so judged.,, I take a direct interest in the 
existence of what I find pleasing as a satisfaction of 
personal inclination. I take a direct interest in the 
existence of some thing I judge good as a satisfaction of 
the will. 97 
In contrast, Kant holds that the first moment of a 
judgment of beauty is immediate. A judgment of something as 
beautiful, because it does not employ any concept, "neither 
[being) based on concepts nor directed towards them as 
96rbid., p. 45; (5:204). 
97Ibid., pp. 47-51; (5:205-209). 
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purposes," arises as the result of a free interplay between 
the understanding and imagination. 98 This free interplay 
between the understanding and imagination results in an 
immediate relationship between the experiencing agent and 
that which is experienced; a relationship not mediated by 
any concept. 99 
The second moment, quantity, is that of universality.· 
Because a judgment of beauty does not employ any concept, 
and, thu~, is disinterested, Kant holds that we cannot "help 
judging that it must contain a basis for being liked [that 
holds] for everyone. 11100 In other words, if I judge 
something as beautiful, my liking for it as beautiful is not 
due to any personal inclination (it is not pleasing) or 
subjective rational interest (it is not good for}. I then 
cannot but feel that others will experience the same 
disinterested liking since neither personal inclination nor 
subjective rational interest were involved in my initial 
judgment of the thing as beautiful. 
The third moment, relation, is that of indeterminate 
purposiveness. Because a judgment of something as beautiful 
cannot involve any concept, the purposiveness of nature, as 
an a priori principle for judgment, must here be a 
98:r bid . , p . 51 ; ( 5 : 2 0 9 } . 
99Ibid. 
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°:cbid., p. 54; (5:211). 
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purposiveness without any determinate concept of a purpose. 
Kant states that "a purpose is the object of a concept 
insofar as we regard this concept as the object's 
cause ... and the causality that a concept has with regard to 
its object is purposiveness." He further states that "[t]he 
power of desire, insofar as it can be determined to act only 
by concepts ... would be the will." It is possible, then, 
to speak of "a purposiveness without a purpose" if we do not 
posit a will as the cause of the purpose but, yet, can only 
posit the possibility of the purposiveness as deriving from 
a will. 101 This "purposiveness without a purpose" is a 
subjective judgment in that it arises as a result of the 
feeling generated in us by the free interplay of imagination 
and understanding. 
The fourth moment, modality, is that of necessity. 
This cannot be a logical necessity due to the fact that a 
judgment of beauty employs no concept whatsoever. Kant does 
not argue that if I judge something as beautiful, everyone 
else will also judge it as beautiful. Rather, it is the 
case that my judgment of something as beautiful necessarily 
leads me to feel that everyone else ought to find the thing 
beautiful. This, however, is not a determinate 'ought' like 
the moral 'ought'. Because no concept can be involved, it 
is a merely subjective 'ought'. It is a necessity which 
101Ibid., p. 64-65; (5:220). 
Kant terms "exemplary, i.e., a necessity of the assent of 
everyone to a judgment that is regarded as an example of a 
universal rule that we are unable to state. 11102 
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This "exemplary necessity" which characterizes 
judgments of beauty arises from the necessary presupposition 
of a common sense of feeling which needs exist as analogous 
to the sensus communis which is required for the com-
municability of empirical cognitions. Kant argues that all 
cognitions and judgments "must be universally 
communicable. 11103 But if our cognitions must be universally 
communicable, then "the mental state, i.e., the attunement 
,of the cognitive powers" that makes cognition itself 
possible, must also be universally communicable. 104 This 
"attunement of the cognitive powers" when it does not 
involve in any way a concept is the very basis of the 
feeling we call 'beauty'; namely, the free interplay between 
imagination and understanding. 
Judgments of beauty are disinterested, universal, 
subjective and necessary. Kant's aesthetic theory clearly 
holds that a judgment of beauty cannot have "an interest as 
its determining bas is. " 105 According to Kant, an interest is 
102Ibid. , p. 85; (5:237). 
103rbid. , p. 87; (5:238). 
104:rbid. , p. 88; (5:238). 
105rbid. , p. 163; (5:296). 
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the liking we have for an object's existence, and "a liking 
always refers at once to our power of desire. 11106 But if my 
judgment of something is determined by my power of desire 
with regard to the thing, I have judged the thing as good or 
pleasing, not as beautiful. Kant does, however, allow that, 
a judgment of beauty having been made absent interest, an 
interest may subsequently be connected with the object of 
the judgment indirectly. Further, the connection of an 
indirect interest; i.e., an interest without any purpose; 
with the object first judged as beautiful can also give rise 
to "a pleasure in the existence of the object. 11107 In other 
~~rds, if I take an indirect interest in something, I can 
have a liking for the something's existence even though my 
liking is not determined by my power of desire. 
In order to connect an interest indirectly with the 
object of a judgment of beauty, "we must think of taste as 
first of all connected with something else. 11108 The 
"something else" may be either empirical or intellectual in 
character. Kant argues that taste is of empirical interest 
only in society. Taste is the power "to judge whatever 
allows us to communicate even our feeling to everyone 
106r bid . , p ~ 4 5 ; ( 5 : 2 O 4 ) . 
107rbid., p. 163; (5:296). 
108rbid. 
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else. 11109 Taste, as a power at least indirectly concerned 
with communication, has value only where there are others 
with whom we may communicate. The connection of taste with 
society, however, is an empirical connection. What Kant 
seeks is an a priori connection; a connection which, being a 
priori, holds for everyone. As Kant points out, if we can 
establish an a priori connection between taste and something 
else, we will better know how to use taste purposively, and 
we will be able to show that the power of judgment serves as 
"a mediating link in the chain of man's a priori powers 
• . • on which all legislation must depend. 11110 But in 
order for the connection to be a priori, the "something 
else" must be intellectual. 
Kant argues that this, intellectual "something else" 
with which taste·is.•connected is "the will's property of 
being determinable a priori by reason. 11111 In other words, 
the human capacity for morality is, for Kant, directly 
linked to the aesthetic capacity. Under a Kantian ethic, 
valid moral judgments are determined by practical reason 
absent, and sometimes despite, interest (as personal 
inclination). It is precisely because valid moral judgments 
are not determined on the basis of inclination that they are 
109rbid., p. 163; (5:296-297). 
11
°Ibid., p. 164; (5:297-298). 
111Ibid., p. 163; (5:296). 
100 
universally valid. Similarly, judgments of beauty are 
determined apart from interest (as personal or rational 
inclination). Because both types of judgment are determined 
without regard for or even despite interest, Kant holds that 
aesthetic judgments of natural beauty are "always a mark of 
a good soul. 11112 Judgments of natural beauty do not depend 
upon an interest (as personal or rational inclination), yet 
such judgments lead us to posit an a priori (universal) 
liking for that which is judged as beautiful in nature. 
Moral judgment does the same thing based on practical reason 
by use of concepts. Judgments of the beautiful in nature, 
then, introduce us to the experience of loving without 
interest. 
It is interesting to note, however, that Kant holds 
this "mark of a good soul" to be the judgment of natural 
beauty, not the judgment of plastic beauty (fine art). The 
reason for this distinction lies in Kant's distinction 
between natural and plastic beauty, and his treatment of 
"genius". He holds that natural beauty refers to a 
beautiful thing, while plastic beauty refers to a beautiful 
presentation of a thing. Further, he terms the production 
of fine art "genius. 11113 When we encounter an example of 
fine art, we correctly attribute the genius of its 
112Ibid., p. 165; (5:298). 
113rbid. , p. 17 9; ( 5: 311) . 
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production to the artist who created the work. Similarly, 
when we encounter an example of natural beauty, we 
necessarily are led to consider wherein lies the genius 
which produced it. Just as the Transcendental Idea of a 
supersensible, rational source of the world. 
serves as the noumenal source for nature's relative 
purposiveness as mentioned in the preceding section, this 
same Transcendental Idea serves as the source for the beauty 
in nature. In this way, contemplation of the beautiful in 
nature leads us to the Idea of God. 
Related to, but interestingly different from, aesthetic 
judgments of beauty are judgments of the sublime. Like 
beauty, Kant argues, sublimity is not a property possessed 
by things. Rather, we call something sublime because it 
arouses in us an awa'reness of our own sublimity. To call 
some thing sublime is a misstatement; the sublime resides in 
us. "Sublime is what even to be able to think proves that 
the mind has fl power surpassing any standard of sense. 11114 
While nature in its indeterminate purposiveness arouses 
in us that particular feeling which leads to a judgment of 
nature as beautiful, it is nature as chaos which arouses in 
us another, particular feeling which leads us to judge 
nature as sublime. 115 "Nature as chaos" is not to be 
114rbid., p. 106; (5:250). 
115rbid., p. 99; (5:246). 
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interpreted only in terms of pointless destruction or random 
l 
action. Rather, for Kant, this is "chaos" in the .sense of 
existence and activity which leads us beyond the boundaries 
of our powers of cognition. As Kant describes it, regarding 
magnitude, 
our imagination strives to progress toward infinity, 
while our reason demands absolute totality as a real 
idea, and so [the imagination,] ... is inadequate to 
that idea. Yet this inadequacy itself is the arousal 
in us of the feeling that we have within us a 
supersensible power. 116 
What in nature we call sublime is simply that which arouses 
in us an awareness of our own capacity to think what cannot 
possibly be known. It brings us to an awareness of reason's 
. s 
power to go beyond all possible bounds of the understanding. 
It awakens us to ourselves as something more than just 
phenomenal beings. "If the human mind is nonetheless to be 
able even to think the given infinite without contradiction, 
it must have within itself a power that is supersensible. 11117 
Experience of the sublime in nature, then, leads us to a 
view of ourselves as beings who defy explanation in strictly 
mechanistic or sensible terms. 
When we encounter in nature that which we judge 
sublime, we are, in reality, experiencing our own two-fold 
character. We judge as sublime that which gives rise to a 
116rbid., p. 106; (5:250). 
117Ibid., p. 111; (5:254-255). 
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particular feeling in us, a feeling that, in turn, results 
from the understanding's inherent inability to attain to the 
Transcendental Ideas of reason. 
The feeling that it is beyond our ability to attain to 
an idea that is~ law for us is RESPECT .... our 
imagination, even in its greatest effort to do what is 
demanded of it ... proves its own limits and 
inadequacy, and yet at the same time proves its 
vocation to [obey] a law, namely, to make itself 
adequate to that idea. Hence the feeling of the 
sublime in nature is respect for our own vocation. 118 
our very capacity to judge something as sublime is linked to 
our possession of reason. Were it not for reason's power to 
posit Transcendental Ideas, which Ideas are, perforce, 
beyond the power of the understanding to determine in 
experience, we would not be capable of the feeling of 
respect. So it is that, while the experience of natural 
beauty introduces us to love without interest, the 
experience of the sublime introduces us to the experience of 
respecting something even against our interest. Both of 
these capacities (love-without-interest and respect-against-
interest) are necessary for the actualization of the moral 
will. 
Kant's aesthetic theory has a number of significant 
implications for an environmental ethic. As already 
mentioned, when I make a judgment of beauty, I cannot help 
but feel that everyone else ought to make the same judgment. 
118..- . • 
~.1b1.d., p. 114; (5:257}. 
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This, in turn, requires that we assume a common sense of 
feeling, a sensus communis aestheticus. This common sense 
of feeling, in turn, serves to underpin the common 
understanding, the sensus communis logicus, which must be 
assumed for the communicability of our cognitions. 119 
Kant's argument that judgments of natural beauty are 
made absent and even despite interest provides a clear 
refutation of the utilitarian approach to riature. To view 
nature in strictly utilitarian terms is, according to 
Kantian aesthetic theory, effectively to deny ourselves the 
opportunity to experience natural beauty. A utilitarian 
approach to nature, which views natural entities as good 
only insofar as they are good for something else, 
necessarily grounds judgments concerning nature in the 
concept 'purpose'. This is true of both strict utilitarian 
approaches and' what I have''earlier termed nee-utilitarian 
approaches to nature. 
The question might be raised: Can't nature be a good 
because it provides us with the experience of beauty? The 
answer is yes. To value nature because it is beautiful is 
in keeping with Kantjs aesthetic theory if the interest in 
beauty is linked to our moral capacity, our ability to 
determine the will according to practical reason. But if 
this is the case, if we consider nature good by means of an 
119Ibi' d., 162 (5 295) p. ; : . 
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indirect interest, then nature has an immediate, not merely 
instrumental, value. Because nature has immediate value, we 
ought to seek to preserve nature. Because nature has an 
immediate, not merely instrumental, value, nature ought not 
be viewed only in terms of satisfying our sensible wants and 
desires. Our view of nature, rather, oug~t to reflect our 
recognition of our moral duty. We ought, then, to act on 
and towards nature and natural entities in ways that are 
compatible with our existence as moral beings. In other 
words, our treatment of nature ought not be grounded solely 
in sensible needs and desires. For example, our treatment 
of nature ought not be grounded only on economic factors. A 
treatment of nature that is grounded only on economic 
factors is a treatment of nature as a means solely in terms 
of our sensible wants and needs. This is not only a 
reduction of the view of nature, it is also a reduction of 
the view of ourselves to the level of animality. 
Now another question might be raised: What damage is 
done even if we allow a utilitarian approach to despoil 
nature and, thus, deny us the opportunity to experience 
natural beauty as long as plastic beauty remains? As 
already mentioned, natural beauty is a beautiful thing, 
while plastic beauty is only a beautiful presentation of 
some thing. Plastic beauty is a characteristic of a work of 
art; natural beauty is a characteristic of an effect of 
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nature. 1~ In order to judge a work of art as beautiful, I 
must first have "a concept of what the thing is (meant] to 
be, since art always presupposes a purpose in the cause (and 
its causality). 11121 Quite the contrary is true of a judgment 
of natural beauty; I need have no concept of what a natural 
thing is meant to be in order to judge it as beautiful. 122 
From this it follows that, when I experience a work of art 
as beautiful, I am led to think of how the thing harmonizes 
with its purpose. When I experience natural beauty, 
however, what I am led to is the thought of how nature 
harmonizes with my a priori cognitive powers. In other 
words, the experience of natural beauty leads me to feel 
that I am fit for this world. Perhaps more importantly for 
Kant, plastic beauty leads us, regarding its genius, to a 
human artist. Natural beauty, regarding its genius, leads 
us to the supersensible, rational source of the world. 
Kant's aesthetic theory leads us to a view of nature 
which is incompatible with and, I contend, superior to the 
utilitarian approach to nature. The experience of natural 
beauty, according to Kant, proves our fitness for the world, 
and underpins the common understanding required for the 
communicability of our cognitions. Kantian aesthetic theory 
12
°rbid., p. 170; (5:303). 
121Ibid., p. 179; (5:311). 
122rbid. 
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provides a view of nature as having immediate value beyond 
its instrumental value. Nature, as the source of the 
beautiful and of the sublime, introduces us to love-without-
interest and respect-against-interest. In so doing, nature 
introduces us and leads us to our true vocation, our 
existence as moral beings. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE KANTIAN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC 
This chapter will bring together the significant points 
from the preceding chapter into a single ethic. I will 
examine the duties which arise in an environmental ethic 
grounded in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. I will also 
examine some of the questions related to the implementation 
of the duties. Finally, I will discuss some of the 
contextual variables which affect the implementation of the 
ethic. 
The Kantian View of Nature 
According to Kant's theory of knowledge, the goal of 
the understanding is the production of systematic unity out 
of the manifold of experience. The world in which we find 
ourselves is a product of this irrepressible organizational 
activity. Our world is a human construct which we construct 
in community. Nature as an organized system of natural 
entities is also a regulative Idea for human thought about 
natural entities. Nature exists as an organized system due 
to and through.the irrepressible organizational activity of 
the human.understanding. We may, due to a habit of 
language, speak of nature as though it were something 
separate and apart from us. But this is a .. characteristic of 
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our language, not of nature. There can be no nature apart 
from us, and we are an inseparable part of nature. 
Kant's moral theory, which results in primary duties 
from which rights are derivable, presents us with a view of 
human beings as beings for whom morality is necessary and 
not just possible. Morality, according to Kant, is 
necessary for us if we are to be fully human beings. In 
other words, our existence as sensible beings ought to be 
subordinate to our existence as moral beings. Grounding 
morality in moral autonomy, Kant's moral theory results in a 
view of humans as potential possessors of wills that are 
good wills, and so as possessing intrinsic worth. As beings 
capable of moral autonomy, we are all equally deserving of 
respect as persons. Additionally, because Kant grounds 
morality in moral autonomy, the duties to which we are 
obligated, the moral maxims, are guidelines for thought 
about action. When we apply his moral theory to action 
aimed at affecting the public sphere, such publicly oriented 
action ought to arise out of public discourse. A single 
voice can neither fully enumerate nor define our duties to 
the non-human parts of nature. A.single voice can, however, 
try to begin the task. 
According to Kant's theory of teleological judgment, we 
unavoidably approach nature as purposive. We cannot but 
view nature as an organized, purposive system. Our 
organization of nature as a purposive system results in a 
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view of nature as a system of ends aimed at a final end. 
According to Kant, the final end of nature is humanity. But 
this is a humanity composed of humans, not merely as 
sensible beings (animals), but as free, rational beings; 
i.e., ~s moral beings. Further, for Kant, the final end of 
humans, as moral beings, is the "realm of ends;" the 
development of a moral civil society. So it is that the 
non-human parts of nature, as means, are not merely means 
for the satisfaction of our sensible needs and want, but 
also means towards our end as moral beings. 
Now this view of nature's non-human parts as means to 
~_he "realm of ends" seems to impart to nature an 
instrumental value. This is not, however, an instrumental 
value synonymous with the instrumental value of nature as 
presented in the utilitarian approach to nature. The 
utilitarian approach to nature views nature as an instrument 
for humans as sensible beings only. Kant's philosophy 
results in a view of nature and nature's non-human parts as 
also serving as instruments for humans as moral beings. 
According to Kant's moral theory, our existence as sensible 
beings ought to be subordinate to our existence as moral 
beings; i.e., we have a duty to be moral. From this it 
follows that our use of nature as sensible beings also ought 
to be subordinate to our use of nature as moral beings. We 
ought not treat nature and its non-human parts only in terms 
of their usefulness in satisfying our sensible needs and 
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wants. If our treatment of nature and its non-human parts 
is grounded solely in our existence as sensible beings, we 
have, in effect, reduced our vision of ourselves to the 
level of heteronomous, not autonomous, beings. We are 
sensible beings, but we are also something more. 
Kant's theory of reflective teleological judgment 
begins with a view of living things as organisms. An 
organism can only be fully understood and explained in terms 
of the relationship of its parts to the whole. Nature 
overall, as an organized system of ends, also requires an 
organismic; i.e., wholistic, view on our part. Natural 
entities, processes and cycles are, then, parts of the whole 
which we call nature. But another part of nature is the 
organization we bring to its parts through the construction 
of the concept 'nature'. our relationship to the non-human 
parts of nature is a relationship in nature. As moral 
beings we are the final end of nature. Because our 
relationship to nature is a relationship in nature, we have 
a position of superiority in nature, but not over nature. 
Now we do find in Kant's philosophy that nature has not 
only a morally-grounded instrumental value but also an 
immediate, aesthetic value. Nature as a component in the 
experience of beauty and sublimity has a worth quite 
separate from any instrumental value. Nature provides us 
the experience of beauty and of sublimity. Further, for 
beauty to be beauty, according to Kant, our interest in it 
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cannot be direct. In order to judge something as beautiful, 
in order to experience beauty, my judgment cannot involve a 
determinate concept (purpose). Because my judgment of 
something as beautiful cannot involve a determinate concept, 
my interest in the thing judged beautiful (my liking for it) 
also cannot involve a determinate concept. Consequently, my 
liking for natural beauty can only be a liking for the mere 
contemplation of natural beauty. 
Kant does allow, however, an indirect interest in 
natural beauty. This indirect interest in natural beauty 
can arise if the experience of natural beauty can be 
connected with something else. According to Kant, this 
'something else' is the will's capacity to be determined by 
practical reason. In other words, the capacity I possess 
which makes it possible for me to experience natural beauty 
is the same capacity which makes it possible for me to be 
moral also. In this way Kant links 'the beautiful' arid 'the 
moral'. Further, because we can have an indirect interest 
in nature (as natural beauty), we can also have an interest 
in the existence of nature. 
Now our indirect interest in nature is grounded in our 
potential for morality. Kant's moral theory results in a 
view of morality, grounded in moral autonomy, as not only 
possible but necessary for us fully to be human beings. In 
other words, we have a duty to be moral. Because our 
potential for morality is the basis of our indirect interest 
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in nature, and because our indirect interest in nature 
allows an interest in the existence of nature, as beings who 
ought to be moral we are also beings who ought to preserve 
nature. In other words, our duty to be moral leads to a 
duty to preserve nature. Further, because Kant's theory of 
teleological judgment leads to a view of nature which is 
wholistic, our duty to preserve nature is a duty to preserve 
nature viewed wholistically. 
Our Duties Towards Nature 
Nature, as a regulative Idea, is an ideal whole which 
is itself composed of smaller empirical wholes, the 
~cosystems. Our duty to preserve nature is a duty to 
preserve ecosystems as wholes. Preserving an ecosystem as a 
whole means preserving the viability of the system overall. 
Systems within nature, like nature itself, are dynamic 
systems. Change is inherent in natural systems. Preserving 
an ecosystem thus means preserving a system of various life 
forms in a manner such that the system remains diverse and 
dynamic. 
Now the question might be raised: "If nature as a 
system only exists due to and through our understanding, how 
is it possible for nature not to be preserved as long as we 
are preserved?" The key to the answer lies in ''nature as a 
system.'' It may well be possible to preserve natural 
entities without preserving natural systems. Zoos, for 
example, formerly preserved various species of animals as 
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discrete entities. These old-style zoos, however, did not 
preserve the natural systems of which the various species 
were parts. 
Ecosystems are systems composed of natural entities. 
systems, in turn, are totalities which derive their 
identities as systems from their internal organization. A 
system is a unitary organization of parts, not merely an 
aggregate of parts. Merely preserving natural entities does 
not fulfill our duty to preserve ecosystems. 
Because human beings are an inseparable part of nature, 
preserving ecosystems means preserving ecosystems of which 
human beings are a part. Human existence necessarily 
' " 
entails human action in and on nature. As living beings we 
are parts of the ecosystems in which we live. Human action 
in and on nature is an unavoidable activity for our 
't, 
continued existence. Because we have a duty to preserve 
ecosystems, when acting on nature, we have a duty not to act 
in ways that needlessly undermine or destroy ecosystems as 
wholistic systems. our actions regarding nature need to be 
tempered by a concern for the effects of our actions on the 
viability of the natural systems in which we act. As our 
knowledge of nature develops through the science of ecology, 
we come to understand more fully the interconnections and 
interdependencies between and among various forms of life. 
As our ecological knowledge increases, then, we come to know 
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better what changes in nature are possible, what changes can 
be made without compromising the viability of the whole. 
Recent studies have served to support the theory that 
ecosystems contain species which have a disproportionate 
effect upon the systems in which they are found. For 
example,'one recent study found that by removing all members 
of three species of kangaroo rats from a desert plain 
resulted in the transformation of the system into an arid 
grassland in just ten years. 1 
Even the most cursory examination of nature reveals it 
to be composed of a vast multiplicity of diverse forms. 
pver time and through a growing body of scientific 
knowledge, we ·have come to realize that many of the natural 
' . 
entities which exist today are significantly different from 
the natural entities which existed during earlier periods. 
We now know, for example, that there is a natural process of 
forestation of grasslands. Additionally, we know that 
species extinction is also a natural process. Nature, 
though fundamentally a process of change, is also 
characterized by diversity. Thus, preserving nature means 
preserving a changing and diverse nature. Preserving nature 
means preserving a viable system of nature; it means 
preserving ecosystems as wholes; as viable, dynamic systems. 
1warren E. Leary, "Removing Rats Alters Environment," 
New York Times, 25 December 1990, sec. L, p. 38. 
116 
Now the question might be raised: Even if we have a 
duty to preserve nature, why ought we preserve a diverse 
nature? If we do not preserve a diverse nature, the nature 
that we do .preserve will be a nature limited in a number of 
possible ways. We may decide to preserve only what we like 
and can use. We may decide to preserve only what is 
absolutely essential for our .biological existence. Both of 
these possible choices are in violation of our duty to view 
nature as more than just an instrument for satisfying our 
sensible needs and wants. Further, the world which we have 
constructed over time and in which we have developed is, 
itself, a world of diversity. It is a world that includes a 
nature that is diverse. Because nature is a construction of 
the understanding, if we preserve a nature greatly 
diminished in its diversity, we run the risk of diminishing 
ourselves also. Finally, the world in which we act as moral 
beings includes nature. If the nature we preserve is a 
nature of reduced diversity, then the kinds and numbers of 
questions concerning human action regarding nature will 
likewise be reduced. If the sphere of nature is diminished, 
our sphere of action with regard to nature, even when the 
decision for action is a decision not to act, will be 
diminished also. 
One task that exists for us is to determine which 
changes are of such a character that they ought to be 
allowed, perhaps even fostered, and which changes ought to 
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be prevented. The importance of this task is, perhaps, most 
obvious with regard to changes -involving the introduction, 
development, and. elimination of species of plants and 
animals. Because our duty to preserve nature is a duty to 
preserve nature viewed whollistically, I suggest that 
changes within a natural system ought to be evaluated in 
terms of their effect upon the system as a whole. The scope 
of the whole will be determined by the system in question. 
As I have already pointed out, nature, as a regulative Idea, 
is an ideal whole composed of smaller empirical wholes, the 
ecosystems. A farm, however, is no less an ecosystem than 
the Loess Hills. Thus, the question of what changes 
; -~~ 
constitute acceptable changes will be affected by the scope 
of the whole in question. 
For example, the introduction of the ring-necked 
pheasant (Phasianus colchicus) into North America has not 
had deleterious effects upon the ecosystems in which it is 
found. Although subject to endangerment from overhunting 
and particularly severe winters, the species fits well into 
the surrounding system as a whole. It has not contributed 
to the endangerment or extinction of indigenous species, nor 
has it had negative effects upon human projects. Quite the 
contrary, any negative effect these birds may have on 
agricultural crops is generally considered to be more than 
compensated for by the opportunity they provide for sport-
hunting. 
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Preserving a nature of genuine diversity, I suggest, 
makes nece_ssary the preservation of di verse types of 
ecosystems. Further, the ecosystems we choose for 
preservation cannot be chosen only on the basis of their 
fitness for satisfying our sensible needs and wants. If we 
preserve only those systems which benefit us economically or 
recreationally, we have reverted to a utilitarian approach 
once again. 
Because the Kantian environmental ethic involves a view 
of nature as wholistic, we may wish to shift the focus of 
legislation concerned with the preservation of nature. 
Current legislation aimed at preserving endangered species 
ought, perhaps, to be aimed at preserving ecosystems. The 
current Endangered Species Act is clearly focused on the 
preservation of species, not systems. The Act states, in 
part, "various species of fish, wildlife, and plants. 
have been rendered extinct ... other species . are in 
danger of or threatened with extinction." The Act sets, as 
policy, the conservation of "endangered species and 
threatened species. 112 I contend that we ought to consider 
redirecting the focus of such legislation. In point of 
fact, experience indicates that when a species becomes 
sufficiently endangered to qualify for protection under the 
,
2u.s. Code: Containing the General and Permanent Laws 
of the United· States, in Force on January 3,, 1989, 1988 ed., 
28 vol: (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing Office, 1989), vol. 
6, pp. 1327-1328. 
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Act, it is frequently the case that efforts to preserve the 
species are synonymous with efforts to preserve the 
ecosystem. For example, efforts to save the northern 
spotted owl call for a concomitant effort to save old-growth 
forests. 3 Species are parts of the ecosystem (whole) they 
inhabit. As we'come to understand more fully the 
relationships among the parts of an ecosystem and between 
each part and the whole, we come to realize that a change in 
a part is connected to a change in the whole. Threatened or 
endangered species thus serve as a sort of 'miner's canary' 
for the ecosystems of which they are a part. 
Human actions affecting nature which arise from 
decisions grounded solely on economic considerations are 
morally inappropriate actions. If the decision which 
determines an action affecting nature is based only on 
economic factors,•;it is a decision which views nature only 
as an 'instrument for serving our sensible wants and desires. 
This is, as already mentioned, a reduction of nature that is 
incompatible with the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Further, 
it is a concomitant reduction of our vision of ourselves to 
the level of heteronomous beings.· 
Additionally, human actions affecting nature are 
actions which take place within an ecosystem. If a human 
action affects the ecosystem in which it occurs, and if the 
3Charles c. Mann and Mark L. Plummer, "The Butterfly 
Problem," The Atlantic Monthly, January 1992, 48. 
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action is grounded only in economic considerations, it is an 
action which does not take into account the preservation of 
the ecosystem as a viable whole. such action, by chance, 
may not harm the viability of the whole, but this is not 
enough. Our duty to preserve ecosystems as viable wholes 
makes it necessary for us to consider, not only the economic 
effects of our actions on ecosystems, but the ecological 
effects of our actions as well. It is not the case that 
economics, per se, is immoral. But an economics which 
affects ecosystems without consideration of the effect on 
the natural system as a system is inappropriate. 
This point is of special significance with regard to 
domesticated plants and animals. Treating domestic animals, 
and in particular, livestock, in ways that are not grounded 
solely on economic c6nsiderations would seem to call for 
changes in some of the ways we treat these animals. For 
example, the practice of raising hogs in confinement is a 
practice grounded in economic considerations. Hog-
confinement operations produce more pork, more tender pork, 
more quickly and efficiently than facilities that allow hogs 
to move about and root. Rather than adapting technology to 
the animal, sophisticated farming methods tend to adapt the 
animal to the technology. This has resulted in farms 
frequently referred to as factory farms. 
As I have already pointed out, however, a farm is an 
ecosystem. Farm animals are thus parts within a ecosystem. 
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Farming methods which seek to adapt the animal to the 
technology affect the parts of the whole, and thus the whole 
itself. Whether such changes in the parts (animals) can be 
carried out without compromising the integrity of the 
ecosystem as a whole is a question which ought, I submit, be 
investigated. If we wish our farms to continue to be viable 
ecosystems, our actions regarding their parts need to be 
considered in light of their effects on the ecosystem 
itself. 
The treatment of animals on factory farms is the result 
of decision making processes grounded solely in economic 
,consideration. Decisions concerning the treatment of 
animals that are grounded solely in economic considerations 
are examples of heteronomous action on the part of the human 
bein~s involved. Such decisions are examples of human 
choice, :,but not free, choice~ Such heteronomous behavior on 
our part is inc6mpatible with Kantian morality as grounded 
in autonomy. 
Because our decision concerning actions regarding 
nature are not morally appropriate when based solely on 
economic factors, we may<want to consider establishing 
livestock laws similar to those recently established in 
Sweden~ The Swedish law requires, in part, that cattle be 
allowed to graze and pigs to root. Chickens cannot be 
confined in cramped cages but must be allowed to range 
freely. Hormones and antibiotics can only be administered 
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for the treatment of disease. Finally, even slaughtering 
methods are required to be as humane as possible. 4 In this 
way, although livestock remains livestock, animals raised 
for food, the treatment of the animals is not based solely 
on economic factors. Rather, the Swedish livestock laws 
require that human action regarding farm animals be 
considerate of the natural characteristics and needs of the 
animals themselves. Instead of being treated as mere means 
to human economic satisfaction, Swedish farm animals are 
treated as living organisms (wholes) whose natural 
characteristics and needs (parts) are necessary to the 
prganism (as a whole). In other words, to be a cow means, 
in part, to be an animal which grazes; grazing is part of 
'cowness'. To deny a cow the opportunity to graze is to 
treat the animal as a whole in a way that ignores a part of 
that whole. It is a reduced vision of cows. 
Maintaining the integrity of natural systems as wholes 
may, in some cases, actually mean restoring the integrity of 
the whole. For example, natural systems generally require 
the presence of a primary predator in order to control the 
population levels of animal species in the system. This 
population control is frequently accomplished by sport-
hunting. There are; however; some natural systems in which 
hunting is not allowed; for example, national parks. If 
4steve Lohr, "Swedish Farm Animals Get a Bill of 
Rights," New York Times, 25 October 1988, sec. A, p. 1. 
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such areas lack sufficient types or numbers of primary 
predators, it would see~ that a· morally appropriate ac~ion 
on our part would be the reintroduction of primary 
predators. 
The Kantian environmental ethic has its ground, in 
part, in Kant's moral theory. Kant's moral theory regarding 
human action results in primary duties, not rights. So too, 
the Kantian environmental ethic also results in duties. 
Further, just as Kant's moral theory is expressed by the 
Categorical Imperative, the environmental ethic can also be 
expressed in terms of a categorical imperative concerning 
our actions toward nature . Like the Categorical Imperative, 
. the environmental imperative is a guideline for thought 
about actions. 
Our duty to preserve nature can be formulated as a 
positive and universal maxim: Act with regard to nature in 
a way such that the affected ecosystem is maintained as a 
viable, dynamic whole. In other words, act to maintain the 
integrity of the whole as a whole. This formulation defines 
the kinds of action that are appropriate and permissible. 
It also serves to define inappropriate kinds of action as 
well. Actions that compromise the integrity of a natural 
system as a viable and dynamic whole are clearly not actions 
that maintain the integrity of the whole. This formulation 
serves to define the kinds of action that are allowed and 
that are required of us by the Kantian ethic; the kinds of 
actions regarding nature that are required of us in order 
for us to be moral beings. This formulation, then, can 
serve as a universal (categorical) imperative for our 
actions concerning nature. 
contextual Factors 
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Our duty to preserve nature viewed wholistically 
results in a universal moral maxim. Like the categorical 
Imperative, this is not a maxim for action, but, rather, a 
maxim for thought about action. The Kantian environmental 
ethic results in duties on our part towards the non-human 
parts of nature. Due to the "play-room" in ethics, however, 
these duties are only general guidelines for thought about 
' s 
action. How these duties are translated into actions will 
depend upon a number of contextual factors. Some, although 
perhaps not all, of these factors are: the type of area and 
its condition; the level of ecological knowledge and 
technology; and the portion of the human population that is 
held to be involved and their economic considerations. 
The type of area and its condition, as contextual 
factors, can result in actions which, differing greatly 
between areas, are nonetheless ethically appropriate to 
their contexts. At the present time, brushtail possums 
(Trichosurus vulpecula) are posing a serious threat to the 
integrity of the New Zealand ecological system. The animal 
was imported into New Zealand in order to establish a fur 
trade. Native to Australia, in New Zealand the brushtail 
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possum has no predators other than human trappers. In the 
late 1980's the bottom fell out of the fur market; the 
number of New Zealand trappers declined by 70%. As a 
result, the brushtail possums are increasing in population 
at a dramatic rate, and consuming various plant species at 
an alarming rate. Many of these plant species exist nowhere 
else in the world. Consequently, the New Zealand government 
is involved in efforts to reduce the possum population. 
Neighboring Australians, however, are bringing pressure on 
New Zealand to cease its governmental trapping programs. 
The brushtail possum, which is native to Australia, is fully 
,protected from human predation in its home country. In 
Australia, however, the possum has a number of natural 
predators which serve to keep the possum population in 
check. 5 Because the possum has natural predators sufficient 
to control its population in Australia, protection of the 
animal from human predation is appropriate. Lacking such 
natural predators in New Zealand, the duty to preserve 
natural systems makes trapping of the animal an appropriate 
action. 
The level of ecological knowledge and technology are 
also contextual factors which ought to be considered when 
deliberating on action involving the non-human parts of 
nature~ In 1973,' a program was enacted to save from 
5No~l Vietmeyer, 11 0 Possums! New Zealand's Immigrants 
Run Amok," Smithsonian 23, no. 4 (July 1992): 92-101. 
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extinction the red wolf (Canis niger) of the southeastern 
United States. Between 1973 and 1980 four hundred animals 
were captured and examined. It was found that, over time, 
the red wolves had hybridized through breeding with local 
coyote populations. Of the four hundred animals examined, 
only forty wolves were judged pure red wolves and, thus, 
suitable for captive breeding efforts. 6 
In Last Animals at the Zoo, Colin Tudge examines the' 
past and future role of zoos as breeding facilities for 
endangered and threatened species. Tudge admits that the 
number of breeding members o_f a species necessary to 
successfully maintain the species over a significant period 
of time can vary from species to species. He posits, 
however, a "ballpark figure" of five hundred breeding 
members as necessary in order to maintain 90% genetic 
diver~ity over two hundred years. 7 Even if we cut Tudge's 
"ballpark figure" by 90%, when applied to the red wolf 
preservation ~ffort, the forty wolves which constituted the 
captive breeding stock may well have been insufficient in 
number for long term success. This is not to imply that the 
red wolf preservation effort was wrong at the time it was 
begun. But it does seem to indicate that, if presented with 
6Jeffrey P. Cohn, "Red Wolf in the Wilderness," 
Bioscience 37, no~ 5 (May, 1987): 314-316. 
7Colin Tudge, Last Animals at the Zoo: How Mass 
Extinction Can Be Stopped (Washington, o.c.: Island Press, 
1992), p. 80. 
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a similar situation in the future, we will need seriously to 
question the ~ationaiity of an effort to preserve a species 
which has insufficient breeding stock. One effect of 
Tudge's work may be a redefinition of such terms as 
'endangered' and 'threatened'. 
As already established by the application of Kant's 
moral theory, public actions ought to arise out of public 
discourse. The portion of the human population considered 
to constitute the 'public' is another contextual factor for 
deciding morally appropriate actions regarding the nonhuman 
parts of nature. Actions involving nationally owned or 
pommonly held areas ought to be the result of public 
discourse involving the citizens of the nation. Due to the 
inherent interdependence of global, life-sustaining cycles 
and processes, there are actions which ought to arise out of 
public discourse on an international scale. Also, there are 
vast areas on this planet that are owned by no individual or 
country, and thus, in a sense, are owned by everyone; e.g., 
the oceans. Questions concerning these areas ought likewise 
arise out of public discourse that is global. Finally, 
there are questions concerning actions undertaken at a local 
,, ·-
or national level which, because the actions result in 
global effects, ought to arise out of discussion that is 
global, or at least global in view. For example, although 
the rainforest of Brazil is Brazil's rainforest, the effects 
caused by its destruction are global. Global discussion 
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concerning the fate of such rainforests is appropriate. 
Closer to home, the fact that A~ericans, who constitute less 
than 5% of the world's population, use almost 25% of the 
planet's energy to sustain a life-style and economy which 
are based on production and consumption of material goods, 
makes that life-style and economy, as it is presently 
sustained, morally questionable. This is not to say that we 
must, necessarily, reduce our standard of living to that of 
less developed nations. I suggest, however, that our 
disproportionate consumption of finite energy requires us, 
as moral beings, actively to seek out alternative energy 
sources. What we claim for ourselves as a right, we cannot 
deny to other persons. To consume finite energy sources in 
a way that, ipso facto, denies other persons and nations an 
energy supply sufficient to attain to a life-style 
commensurate with that which we enjoy, is to make an 
exception of ourselves. Such exception-making is not 
compatible with Kantian moral theory. 
In conclusion, the Kantian approach results in an 
environmental ethic that is wholistic and non-utilitarian. 
As fully human beings we have duties to ourselves, to 
others, and to the non-human parts of nature. Among these 
latter duties are the duty to preserve nature-viewed-
wholistically, to preserve a nature of changing diversity. 
This duty, in turn, requires that we preserve ecosystems as 
integral wholes. Preserving natural wholes, in some cases, 
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also entails the preservation of species. Our actions 
regarding the non-human parts of nature, as public actions, 
ought to arise out of public discourse. It is clear, then, 
that no single voice can accomplish the task of fully 
delineating the Kantian environmental ethic. What each of 
us can, and ought, do is participate in and contribute to 
the effort. 
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